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Three flight simulator experiments examined how a health monitoring system may aid 
pilots in detecting flight control faults. The first experiment introduced an unexpected 
fault in the flight control system during an approach to a fictitious airport.  The second 
experiment used a factorial design of (1) presence – or not—of a Fault Meter display and 
(2) presence – or not – of an Alerting System, which could have one or two phased alerts.  
In half the runs, a fault was triggered at some point, and pilot response was recorded.  
The next experiment comprised one flight in which pilots were given a false alarm by 
these systems, testing for automation bias.  
No consistent pilot response was found to the faults, with pilots sometimes successfully 
landing the aircraft, sometimes immediately or eventually initiating a go-around, and 
sometimes loosing aircraft control and crashing.  The pilots were not able to identify the 
fault in 11% of the cases. Tunnel tracking error increased following the faults and the 
false alarm, suggesting it may be both a manifestation of attempts to diagnose a fault and 
a cue to pilots of a problem. Finally, the triggering of a false alarm showed the existence 




New technology can provide real time information about the health of the aircraft, 
potentially aiding pilots to manage flight control system problems and other issues that 
have an effect on flight control. (In this dissertation the word “fault” is used in reference 
to any fault, failure or problem that affects flight control.) Analysis of the possible 
advantages of such a technology requires an understanding of the fault management 
processes used by pilots, and also the functions by which a health monitoring system 
could help the pilot. As illustration, consider the following examples: 
After performing the required weight and balance calculations, the 
crew of a regional turboprop aircraft found that the weight was 200lb 
over the MTOW. Eight bags were removed from the cargo bay and the 
flight departed. During take off roll, the pilot noticed that the nose 
wheel lifted of the ground before V1, and needed to apply unusual 
down elevator pressure to keep the nose down. At Vr, the aircraft 
rotated and lifted up with no further problems. The climb continued 
and the autopilot was engaged. “At FL203, climbing to FL210, the 
airplane was on autopilot, in climb mode. I felt a buffet and looked at 
the VSI which showed +100 FPM[…]Calibrated airspeed showed 135 
kts, 15 below minimum…[…] I promptly disconnected the autopilot and 
pitched down. We leveled off at FL190 and everything was right. We 
never got a [stick] shaker.” After the flight landed without further 
events, the crew requested a bag count and found that there were 13 
more bags than declared in the manifest. Also, the crew reported that 
some of the bags should have been counted double for their weight. 
Since the baggage compartment is located in the aft section of the 
fuselage, the center of gravity was definitely out of the flight envelope. 
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 Another regional turboprop aircraft crew required a second de-
icing after observing snow on the wings after the first de-icing. 
Subsequently, during take off and initial climb the first officer (F/O) 
noticed that he needed unusual forward pressure to keep the desired 
attitude. He also noted that the elevator trim indicator was full down. 
The captain mentioned that it was probably an inoperative trim 
indicator gauge, and ordered the F/O to continue the flight as planned. 
When cruise altitude was reached and the aircraft accelerated to cruise 
speed, the F/O needed an “unusual large amount of forward pressure” 
and had a hard time maintaining altitude because the aircraft wanted 
to climb. The captain took control of the aircraft and agreed that there 
was a problem. He reduced power and asked the flight attendant to 
move all passengers to the forward section of the cabin. This resolved 
the aircraft tendency to climb and the captain decided to continue the 
flight to its destination. The F/O argued that he wanted to divert to 
nearest airport for possible tail icing, flight control problems and 
flying out of the CG envelope. After some arguing, the captain finally 
agreed to divert and land. During the descent, the situation normalized 
and the trim returned to normal position. A safe landing was 
performed. It was later found that the de-icing personnel had little 
experience and had not de-iced the tail of the aircraft. 
These are two examples of problems that can have a severe impact on flight control. The 
common characteristic is that both problems were not detected by any monitoring or 
detection system of the aircraft. It may be argued that weight sensors in the landing gear 
could detect weight and balance problems, but those systems are currently only installed 
in the bigger wide body aircraft and would not sense, for example, a load shift in flight. 
Icing detectors and sensors are available, but they only inform the pilot that icing 
conditions exist in the location of the aircraft where the sensor is installed. They do not 
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inform the pilot of previous accumulation of ice, or of the impact of the existing ice 
accumulation on the performance of the aircraft. Another characteristic of these problems 
is that they may only be noticeable to the pilot in certain areas of the flight envelope or in 
certain configurations of the aircraft. For example, center of gravity out of range 
condition may not be a problem until flaps are lowered and the elevator trim has not 
enough capacity to compensate for the excessive pitch moment. 
Problems that impact flight control and are difficult to detect via the aircraft’s sensing 
systems may appear not only as a result of external causes such as icing or a careless 
cargo load, but also from the aircraft itself. Sensors may fail to provide correct 
information and disturbances may arise in the autopilot or the Flight Control System 
(FCS). For example, consider the following case: 
“On two consecutive days, the same airplane experienced un-
commanded rolls during flight with the autopilot engaged. Both 
incidents occurred during final phase of the flight, but the crews 
managed to land the aircraft without further problems. Inspection of 
the airplane systems revealed a defect in a roll potentiometer located in 
the captain’s side-stick transducer unit.”  
In this specific case, the FCS computer displayed a generic fault message to the pilot 
when the fault occurred, but after the warning message was given, no extra information 
helped the pilot determine if the fault was still affecting the handling of the aircraft, or, if 
it was, how severe the problem was. In the most advanced fly-by-wire systems, where the 
FCS itself may be compensating for the problem by itself, the pilot’s detection of the 
problem may be very difficult.  
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1.1 Health Monitoring System Concept 
It has been proposed that new technology using advanced control and estimation 
techniques could provide the pilot with information about the general health of the 
aircraft. For the objective of the proposed research, it is important to describe the 
expected characteristics of the information that this system could provide to the pilot. 
Model-based observers such as Kalman filters can be fed with the same control inputs 
that the human pilot or autopilot puts in the real aircraft. An examination between current 
measured states and observer state estimates may indicate deterioration in the flying 
characteristics of the aircraft. This error could be presented to the pilot to help him/her 
manage problems that can affect flight control. (In this document, this type of system is 
referred as a health monitoring system [HMS].)  
The main limitation of the information provided by this type of HMS is that the cause of 
the error is neither directly sensed nor shown to the pilots. Considering the previous 
examples of the regional turboprops, we could assume that a HMS would have measured 
an error in both cases and the magnitude of the error could provide information about the 
severity of the problem. However, the system does not have any the ability to determine 
the cause of the error.  
As aircraft system complexity grows, it would be intuitive to assume a growth in the 
number of monitoring systems could grow to try to cover as many possible faults or 
malfunctions as possible. However, complexity and cost can definitely be limiting factors 
for the implementation of additional sensors and monitors of performance and systems. 
In this context, the information provided by this type of HMS not only would 
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complement the situations where common alerting systems have no detection or sensing 
capacity, but it would also supplement information provided by aircraft alerting systems 
by providing a continuous assessment of the existence and severity of a fault.  
1.2 Pilot Response to Faults  
The analysis of the effects of an HMS in the process of fault management requires an 
understanding of the possible contexts in which the event may occur. The context is 
characterized by many factors such as: time pressure and constraints (e.g. meeting 
departure or arrival times, complying with air traffic control [ATC] commands in heavy 
traffic); environment characteristics (e.g. bad weather or night flying, smoke in the 
cockpit); pilot personal conditions (e.g. fatigue, emotional state); workload; availability 
of relevant operating procedures; and different tasks or phases of flight.  
Within this operational context, fault management can be identified to occur at three 
levels: At the system level, the pilot monitors system parameters, diagnoses abnormal 
system states, makes prognoses and compensates within the system. If compensation is 
not effective, fault management at this level may impact processes at the aircraft level, 
which consists in all activities related to maintaining control of the aircraft’s attitude, 
altitude, and speed and direction of flight. For example, compensation at this level may 
require adapting the pilot’s control strategy for maintaining level flight after a cargo shift 
occurs. Problems that can not successfully be managed at the aircraft level may have an 
impact at the mission level. This level involves all fault management that impacts the 
overall flight objectives, such as destination airport, route of flight, etc. Factors at this 
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level can include weather, fuel availability, terrain, Air Traffic Control constraints. Figure 
1 represents the fault management tasks at the three operational levels. 
For this research, it is most important to understand how pilots react to faults and/or 
problems that are not detected by the standard alerting and monitoring systems of the 
aircraft, such as the three cases presented in the system introduction. In such cases, the 
pilot does not have enough information available to manage the situation at the systems 
level.  Therefore, the focus of interest here will be mostly at the aircraft level. But, as 
mentioned before, faults occurring at the aircraft level may have a cascading effect at the 
mission level. Within each level, fault management may be defined as four operational 
tasks: detection, diagnosis, prognosis and compensation, shown in Figure 1. Not all tasks 
may be required during every particular fault management process. Rasmussen 
(Rasmussen, 1983) described Skill Based and Rule Based Behaviors (RBB and SBB) as 
shortcuts and shunts between elements of the decision ladder. The SBB describe 
automated response patterns, obtained from extensive training or experience while RBB 
responses are based on associations between the environmental cues and stored rules or 
procedures for action. Without these shortcuts, the pilot would have to go through all the 













1.3 The HMS, the Alerting System and the Fault Meter 
The HMS output provides a continuous real time measure of the error between the on-
board simulation and the real status of the aircraft. This measure could be fed into an 
automated system set to alert the pilot when the HMS error values reach a certain 
threshold. But, even with the simplest designs the “alarm problem” (Woods, 1995) 
describes the set of factors associated with alerting systems that contribute to difficulties 
in fault management. For example, the costs of miss detection and false alarms are 
fundamental in selecting of the most effective alerting thresholds and the utility of multi-
phase alerts. Of particular concern in the design is the human tendency toward 
automation bias, which occurs when a human decision maker uses a computer-generated 
solution as a heuristic replacement for at least part of a fault management process. 
(Parasuraman and Riley, 1997) 
Alternatively, the HMS output can be continuously presented to the pilot (e.g. on a 
gauge). In the context of this research, an instrument displaying continuously the HMS 
output is called a “fault meter”. The first important additional information provided by 
the fault meter is trend: pilots can observe the gradual degradation of the health of the 
aircraft, and have useful additional time to start the diagnosis of the problem. Also, the 
value can provide information about the severity of the fault within predefined ranges of 
status. For example, in a scale of 100, values from 0 to 50 could be acceptable or normal. 
However, constant high values in the vicinity of 40 to 50 could mean that there is a 
potential problem, even if the aircraft is airworthy. Finally, the fault meter could be used 
as a tool to evaluate the effectiveness of the pilot’s compensation for the fault.  
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1.4 Objectives and Hypotheses 
The health monitoring system concept described in section 1.1 opens several human-
system interaction questions. Since degradation of the aircraft health should eventually 
trigger fault management processes, it is important to investigate how pilots implement 
these processes and what roles are open to the new HMS concept. The objectives of the 
experiments are first to investigate how pilots respond to certain faults and problems 
degrading flight control; and, second, to investigate how a HMS as described in the 
previous sections can help the pilots detect and manage these faults. The hypotheses 
associated with these objectives are:  
1- Origin and cause of faults degrading flight control can be difficult to detect and 
diagnose. Response will vary significantly within and between pilots.  
2- The HMS information will help pilots detect and respond to faults degrading 
flight control.  
3- The fault meter will be preferred over the alerting system because of the 
additional trend information allowing for continuous health status monitoring and 
earlier detection of health degradation. 
4- The HMS will not affect pilot performance at their normal tasks. Workload and 
flying performance will not be affected by the fault meter or alerting system. 
5- Automation bias in pilot responses can be induced by the HMS. Specifically, a 




2 Experimental Method 
2.1 Overview 
This study was a collaboration effort between the School of Aerospace Engineering of 
the Georgia Institute of Technology and the Control and Simulation Research Group of 
the Aerospace Faculty at Delft University of Technology (TUDelft), The Netherlands. 
The experiments were conducted in the Netherlands during the summer of 2002 under the 
direction of Dr. M. Mulder, Dr. M. M. van Paassen and Dr. A. Pritchett.  
Each pilot participated in a series of four experiments lasting for a day. The experiments 
investigated different objectives. They were conducted sequentially and the transition 
from one to the next was not salient from the pilot’s perspective.  
The first experiment examined different FCS and simulator motion settings impact on 
pilot performance while flying a Tunnel-in-the-Sky display. Pilots flew 18 curved 
approaches to a fictitious airport in instrument meteorological conditions and light 
turbulence. Three different flight control systems were used. Before each run, the 
simulator’s motion system was turned on or off. (The pilots were briefed that different 
motion system settings were going to be tested.)  
Although the motivation and objectives of this experiment are not the focus of this thesis, 
a detailed description is included in section 2.4, since it is closely related to all other 
experiments and it served as training for the pilots in the simulator for the subsequent 
experiments. Results of experiment #1 can be found in Mulder et al. (2003).  
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Since the pilot was never informed about the exact number of approaches he was going to 
fly, experiment #2 was appended to experiment #1 as a single additional approach. 
During this approach, a fault was introduced reducing pitch and roll control effectiveness. 
The objective was to investigate pilot reaction to an unexpected problem without any 
warning or change in the conditions used for experiment #1.  
Experiment #3 is the core of this thesis. During this experiment, pilots were told about 
the possibility of encountering faults, and health monitoring system information was 
provided through the fault meter and alerting system. In half of these runs, a different 
single fault or problem that affected the flight control was triggered. These approaches 
were flown in visual meteorological conditions and the motion system was always on.  
For Experiment #4, each pilot flew one additional approach after experiment #3. This run 
was identical to those in the previous experiment except that a false alarm was triggered. 
The pilot was not aware of the number of runs in experiment #3 and no additional 
briefing was given for this experiment. Therefore, the transition from experiment #3 was 
not noticeable to the pilot. Its objective was to investigate for possible automation bias.  
A typical day for a pilot was: 
8:00 – 8:30  briefing  
8:30 – 11:40  experiment #1 and #2, about 28 approaches 
11:40 – 12:00   debriefing on morning runs 
12:00 – 12:40  lunch  
12: 45 – 1:10   briefing 
1:10 – 4:50   experiment #3 and #4, about 26 approaches 
4:50 – 5:10    debriefing on afternoon runs 
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This schedule was designed such that experiments #1 and #2 were conducted during the 
morning and experiments #3 and #4 were conducted during the afternoon. However, 
unexpected simulator problems often made it difficult to complete the 54 approaches 
planned for each pilot before the end of the day. Therefore, while some pilots finished all 
the approaches in one day-long session, most pilots were scheduled to complete the 
experiment in two half-day sessions on different days, experiments #1 and #2 on one day, 
and #3 and #4 on a second day. The second session was usually scheduled within a few 
days. 
2.2 Subjects 
Twelve professional pilots participated in the experiments. All were current in jet air 
transport aircraft, ranging from regional jets to the Boeing 747-400. Their demographics 
are summarized in. They had an average of 4100 flight hours, and all had at least 1000 
flight hours in glass cockpits. Table 1 shows the pilot’s information in descending order 
of experience. This ranking was prepared by taking into account the total number of 
hours, the current position (Captain, First Officer, Second Officer) and the number of 
aircraft in which they have been trained. For example, Pilot #8, with only 1500 hours as 
First Officer was considered to have more experience than Pilot #4 with 4000 hours as 
Second Officer. Second officers (also know as cruise relief pilots) are usually limited to 
very few tasks during the cruise portion of long flights and are not allowed to fly the 
aircraft below 10,000 ft. All pilots obtained their initial flight training from civilian flight 














Last Position University 
Education 
1 1 13000 B747 Captain M.S. Aero. Eng. 
2 2 7000 B757/767 Captain B.S. Mech. Eng. 
3 7 4500 B757/767 First Officer M.S. Aero. Eng. 
4 6 4500 B757/767 First Officer None 
5 12 4800 B757/767 First Officer None 
6 9 1900 B737 First Officer B.S. Aero.Eng. 
7 10 1800 B757/767 First Officer None 
8 8 1500 CRJ-100 First Officer M.S. Aero.Eng. 
9 4 4000 MD-11 Second Officer M.S. Aero.Eng. 
10 3 3700 B747 Second Officer None 
11 11 1500 B747 Second Officer M.S. Aero.Eng. 




2.3.1 The SIMONA Research Simulator 
The experiments were conducted at the International Research Institute for Simulation, 
Motion and Navigation (SIMONA), part of the Delft University of Technology 
(TUDelft). The Institute operates an advanced research flight simulator which was 
designed and built by several groups within the University in cooperation with partners 
from government and industry. 
The SIMONA research simulator, shown in Figure 2, offers uncommon motion capability 
due to its light weight design and sophisticated motion system. The cab weight in 
operating conditions, including all visual hardware, avionics equipment and a crew of 
two pilots, is less than 4500 kg. The six degree of freedom hydraulic motion system uses 
six 1.25 meter stroke actuators that can produce instantaneous accelerations ranging from 
0.02 to 1.5g. 
The visual system provides a 180o horizontal and 40o vertical field-of-view with a high 
resolution, collimated out-the-window projection onto a dome mounted around the 
simulator cab. A detailed visual scene was created for the airport that included the 
runway, taxiways, and local features such as trees and buildings. 
The simulator is operated from an external control room in which most of the simulator’s 
computer hardware is located. The basic controls for regular operations are commanded 
through two computers with a simple user interface. Most parameters needed to run the 
different scenarios for this experiment were programmed in two short files to be loaded 
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before each run. These files contained information such as initial position of the aircraft, 
airspeed, turbulence levels, faults, meteorological conditions, etc.  
The simulator recorded 80 different parameters at 25 Hz from. A complete list of these 
parameters is included in Appendix A. Additional parameters were obtained from the 
original data using numerical methods, such as derivatives of the track angle error or 
pitch and roll control inputs. Each run produced a 3 to 4 MB data file, depending on the 









Figure 2 – SIMONA research simulator at Delft University of Technology. 
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2.3.2 Aircraft and Flight Control System Models 
The aircraft dynamic model used for the experiments was developed at TUDelft and 
based on the institute’s flight test aircraft, a Cessna Citation II. This aircraft has a 
Maximum Take-Off Weight (MTOW) of 6400 kg and a payload of 1400 kg. During the 
experiment, the mass was kept constant at 5000 kg since each approach lasted less than 4 
minutes. The maximum Indicated Airspeed (IAS) of the aircraft at sea level is 262 knots 
IAS, and the stall speed at maximum landing weight and in landing configuration is 84 
knots IAS. Typical approach speeds (Vref) vary between 115 and 130 knots. 
Three different FCS were used in this set of experiments. The “conventional” FCS 
simulates the Cessna Citation FCS, consisting of direct mechanical/hydraulic links 
between the yoke and the control surfaces. The control column and aerodynamic surface 
movements are proportional. The “Attitude Oriented” FCS allows the pilot to command 
roll and pitch rates with the control column. If the stick is centered, the aircraft will 
maintain the bank and pitch angles, regardless of external disturbances such as gusts and 
turbulence.  
The third FCS, referred as Flight Path FCS, was developed at TUDelft to investigate new 
command parameters for flying an aircraft through flight-path-relative displays such as 
tunnel-in-the-sky representations, documented by Veldhuijzen et al. (2003). With this 
FCS the pilot’s flight control inputs command flight path vector (FPV) angle rates. A 
Command-FPV (CFPV) symbol, similar to the FPV symbol, is always given on the 
primary flight display. The pilot’s inputs on the control column are translated into flight 
path angle rate (γ& ) and ground track angle rate ( χ& ) changes, proportional to the 
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displayed distance between the FPV and CFPV. With this FCS, the pilot must keep a 
constant stick deflection to the direction of the turn to maintain a constant turn radius, 
similar to steering an automobile.  
2.3.3 Simulator Flight Deck  
The flight deck, shown in Figure 3, used a typical glass cockpit configuration.  The 
subject occupied the left seat in front of a Boeing type control column. The simulator did 
not have rudder pedals installed in time for the experiments; therefore, all turns were 
automatically coordinated by the FCS. The center pedestal had throttle, flap and speed-
brakes levers from a Boeing 777. Additional reprogrammable switches were available on 
the pedestal, as well as on the yoke. The front panel contained four 15 inch LCD 
displays. The Mode Control Panel shown on Figure 3 and the fifth LCD display located 












The Primary Flight Display (PFD) was shown on a 15 inch LCD display in front of the 
subject. Its tunnel-in-the-sky format, shown in Figure 4, followed the same configuration 
used in previous studies (e.g. Veldhuijzen, Mulder, Van Paassen, & Mulder, 2003).  
Using a three-dimensional ego-centric presentation, a ground-referenced tunnel was 
displayed over a presentation of the outside world. The width and height of the tunnel 
was 45m x 45m. 
Other primary flight information was shown using common formats: altitude, airspeed 
and vertical speed tapes on the sides and a heading compass on the bottom. On the top, a 
flight mode annunciation area indicated autothrottle engagement and FCS mode. The 
bank angle and pitch angle were also displayed on the PFD, both on graphical scales and 
by text. Aircraft flight path was represented by a green flight path vector (FPV) symbol. 
When the Flight Path FCS was used, the yellow Command-FPV symbol was displayed as 
shown on Figure 4. 
To the right of the tunnel display, on a separate 15 inch LCD, a navigation display and 
engine indications were shown. The navigation display represented the horizontal path of 
the tunnel with a solid line. Other common elements typically used in current navigation 
displays were included, such as the track indication and range scale. The autopilot 
heading selector indicator, represented by the dashed line on Figure 5, was not functional, 
as pilots were always asked to fly the airplane manually. As discussed in 2.6.2, the “fault 
















Figure 5 – Navigation and engines displays,  fault meter and alerting system.. 
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2.4 Experiment #1 Description 
Veldhuizen et al. (2003) previously demonstrated that the combination of the tunnel 
display with an advanced flight-path-oriented fly-by-wire control system significantly 
improves the pilot path-following performance and reduces pilot workload.  In addition, 
results of a flight test showed substantial differences in pilot path-following performance 
in tracking straight tunnel trajectories as compared to earlier experiments conducted in a 
fixed-base flight simulator (Mulder et al., 2002).  For example, tunnel-tracking 
performance during a straight-in approach was a factor 2 to 3 times worse in real flight as 
compared in the fixed-base simulator, and workload was reported to be much higher in 
the flight tests (Mulder, Kraeger, & Soijer, 2002). 
These discrepancies raised the question whether results obtained in fixed-base simulators 
are indeed representative of (or can be extrapolated to) pilot behavior in real flight.  They 
suggested that the task of ‘flying a tunnel’ may be sensitive to simulator fidelity, 
including pilot-perceived motion. The objective of experiment #1 was to examine the 
impact of flight simulator motion on pilot workload, control behavior and performance in 
tracking a tunnel using different flight control systems. 
2.4.1 Independent Variables 
Two variables were manipulated in this experiment: first, the flight control system, which 
could vary among the three described in 2.3.2; and second, the simulator motion, which 
was either on or off. The scenarios were changed randomly between two symmetrically 





As soon as they arrived, the pilots were briefed by the experimenter. A printed document 
with color images of the cockpit displays was given to the pilot, and the experimenter 
discussed each paragraph with the pilot. Pilots had ample opportunity to ask questions. 
The complete briefing text is included in Appendix B. 
The briefing first contained an overview of the day activities and an introduction to the 
simulator operation, including emergency stops, fire procedures and intercom 
communications with the simulator control room. They were also informed that an 
experimenter was going to act as copilot and he would engage in some minimal duties. 
These consisted of calling altitudes (500ft, 100ft, 50ft, 40ft, 20ft, and 10 ft) during each 
approach, and administering a short questionnaire and TLX workload ratings after each 
run. The experimenter was to avoid all non-essential conversation during the runs.  
Then, pilots were briefed specifically on this experiment. They were asked to fly a 
number of curved approaches into a fictitious airport. The exact number of approaches 
was vaguely discussed to keep experiment #2 included in the main block of approaches 
as a surprise.  Additional information given to the pilot at this point covered weather, 
different flight control system characteristics, flap and gear configuration, airspeeds, and 
copilot/experimenter role and interaction. Autothrottle (A/T) use instructions were given 
particular attention to encourage pilots to disengage it in case they encountered any 
problem or unusual aircraft behavior so that A/T disengagement could be recorded as an 
indication of pilot’s fault detection. Also, pilots were informed that “different simulator 
motion models” were going to be used but they were not told that the motion was going 
to be on or off. 
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The core of the approaches in which data was collected was composed by three blocks of 
six runs each. Additional training before each block was encouraged to ensure that the 
pilots were comfortable with the FCS change, however pilots rarely accepted more than 
one training run. 
2.4.3 Scenarios 
Each run started with the aircraft positioned at about 16 kilometers of the airport, at the 
beginning of a “tunnel”, i.e., a curved approach trajectory. The geometry of one of the 
tunnels is shown in Figure 6. The other tunnel was mirrored using the runway centerline 
as an axis of symmetry. The weather during all approaches had a dense cloud cover 
creating instrument meteorological conditions at all altitudes down to 200 feet Above 
Ground Level (AGL). Below this altitude, the visibility was very good and, if the pilot 
was stable during the final segment of the tunnel, it was relatively easy to land. Light-to-
moderate turbulence prevailed during the entire approach for all runs. 
The aircraft was configured at the start of the run to 25 deg of flaps and landing gear 
down, providing good handling and airspeeds to fly the entire approach and land. The 
airspeed for the approach was 150 knots, which was maintained by the autothrottle (A/T). 
Pilots were asked to always use the A/T until 500 ft AGL unless they felt there was a 
problem with the aircraft. At 500 ft AGL, the copilot/experimenter would call the altitude 







Figure 6 - Tunnel trajectory geometry for experiments #1 and #2. 
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2.4.4 Experiment Design 
A factorial within subjects design was employed, consisting of six conditions defined by 
three FCS x two motion states. The data runs were blocked by the three FCS with the 
order of the blocks balanced between pilots. Each block had six runs, i.e., three 
replications of each FCS-motion condition. Including training runs, a minimum of 24 
approaches were flown by each pilot. The specific assignment of conditions to each pilot 
is given in Appendix C.  
2.4.5 Dependent Variables 
The dependent measures included: (1) tunnel tracking performance, measured by aircraft 
off-set from tunnel center, and by flight path angle errors expressed relative to the 
approach trajectory; (2) pilot control activity, i.e., control column deflections and their 
rates; (3) aircraft dynamic states, including attitude angles and rates; (4) NASA TLX 
workload ratings; and (5) pilot responses to questionnaires about simulator realism. 
Analysis and results of this experiment can be found in Mulder et al. (2003). 
2.5 Experiment #2 Description 
2.5.1 Objective 
The objective of the experiment was to investigate pilot’s responses to an unexpected 
fault affecting the flight control. In addition to contributing information for validation of 
the first hypothesis, the experiment provided a baseline for experiment #3 in which pilots 




After flying experiment #1, the pilots transitioned without notice to experiment #2. This 
experiment consisted of a single approach in which an unexpected FCS fault occurred. 
Except for the fault all other experimental conditions remained constant from the last 
block of approaches flown by each pilot in experiment #1. Therefore, four pilots flew this 
approach with each of the three FCS.  
2.5.3 Scenario 
The problem triggered for experiment #2 simulated a FCS fault in which the motion 
range of the aerodynamic control surfaces was reduced. The severity of the fault was 
originally designed such that pitch and roll rates would be significantly reduced, but not 
enough to compromise control of the aircraft. The fault was triggered when the aircraft 
reached a preset point in the tunnel, about 5 km from the start, giving the pilot at least 10 
km to recognize the fault and take appropriate actions with a reasonable margin of 
altitude and distance to the airport. 
2.5.4 Dependent Variables 
As with experiment #1, the independent variables were: (1) tunnel tracking performance, 
measured by aircraft off-set from tunnel center, and by flight path angle errors expressed 
relative to the approach trajectory; (2) pilot control activity, i.e., control column 
deflections and their rates; (3) aircraft dynamic states, including attitude angles and rates; 
(4) NASA TLX workload ratings; and (5) a set of questions presented after each 
approach regarding the fault and use of the fault meter and alerting system. 
 
29 
2.6 Experiment #3 Description 
2.6.1 Objectives 
The objectives of experiment #3 are to validate the first four hypotheses presented in 
section 1.4. Recapitulating, experiment #3 searched for answers to the following 
questions: how pilots respond to faults affecting flight control, how HMS information can 
help the pilots in fault detection and management, how the HMS affects pilot 
performance at their normal control tasks, and how the different methods of displaying 
HMS information can help the pilot in the fault management process. 
2.6.2 Independent Variables 
The independent variables for experiment #3 were: (1) availability of fault meter; (2) 
availability of one or two phase alerts; (3) FCS type and (4) fault type.  
A fault meter simulated the “lack of health” of the aircraft: the higher its indicated value, 
the worse the severity of the problem. The yellow arc, from 50% to 80% of the scale, 
indicated “caution”; the red arc, from 80% to 100%, indicated a “warning”. When the 
aircraft was in good health, the fault meter gauge moved at random between values of 5 
and 15 to give the impression that the instrument was “alive”. The ranges for the arcs 
were set arbitrarily, and no strict definition was given to their meaning during the pilot 
briefing, although it is assumed that pilots would associate those standard colors to 
“required pilot action” for yellow and “required immediate action” for red. The pilots had 
to press a “push-to-see” button on the control yoke to see it, allowing the experimenters 
to record when it was viewed. Figure 7 shows how the instrument was hidden. The 
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alerting system provided aural and text alerts based on the same information as the fault 
meter. The text alerts were displayed in a small window below the fault meter. The alerts 
had either one phase or two phases. With two phase alerts, a distinctive sound and yellow 
text message indicated a “FCS caution” when the health value reached 50%; when the 
value reached 80%, a higher pitch sound and red text message indicated a “FCS 
warning”. The one-phase alert system went off only when the 80% value was reached, 
displaying the red text message with its associated high pitch sound. 
During half of the approaches, twelve faults or problems were implemented. The severity 
of the faults was set such that tunnel tracking would be difficult, but aircraft control could 
be maintained, especially if the pilot was able to recognize the fault and develop an 








Figure 7 – Fault meter push-to-see button, pressed (left) and not pressed (right).  
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The design and implementation of the faults and problems was specific to each FCS: six 
faults were specific to the conventional FCS and six to the flight-path-oriented FCS.  
For the conventional FCS, the faults were: 
1- Elevator and 2- Aileron Deflection Reduction: After the fault was triggered, the 
elevator or aileron deflection range was reduced to limit the controllability of the aircraft 
by the pilot. The fault fully developed in approximately 10 seconds. After this period of 
time, full deflection of the yoke produced about 30% of the normal aileron deflection. 
Setting the deflection range for the elevator was critical. The objective was to produce a 
fault severe enough to be noticeable during the approach, but not enough to prevent the 
pilot from flaring.   
3- Flight Path Vector (FPV) Drift Down. When the fault was triggered, the flight path 
vector started to slowly drift down at less than ½ degree per second. This fault simulated 
a sensor failure, such as an angle of attack sensor. When the FPV slowly drifts down, 
there was a period of time in which the deviation was not noticeable but, if used 
continuously as a reference to keep the aircraft in the approach trajectory, a noticeable 
aircraft deviation from the tunnel would eventually occur. Pilots may compensate for this 
deviation with normal inputs and the aircraft position in the tunnel can be corrected. But, 
as the aircraft returns to the center of the tunnel, the pilot may use again the faulty FPV as 
a reference to fly the tunnel, and another deviation occurs, resulting in a series of 
oscillations which are eventually easily noticeable to the pilot as the fault fully develops. 
Other than the faulty FPV indication, the aircraft remains totally airworthy. 
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4- Static Port Blocked: When the fault was triggered, the static port of the air data system 
was blocked. As in a conventional system, the altimeter and the vertical speed indicator 
froze, and the airspeed indication became function of the altitude, reading lower in a 
climb and higher in a descent. In a tunnel in the sky display system there can be 
additional consequences to a static port blockage. In this case, since the only altitude 
information was provided by air data system, the display system assumed that the aircraft 
was not descending anymore, but the tunnel was generated using the actual horizontal 
position of the aircraft. Therefore, the PDF showed a faulty “Tunnel in the Sky”, below 
the intended approach trajectory.  
5- Autothrottle Failure: When the fault was triggered, the autothrottle reference speed 
was gradually changed to lower values, reducing the engine thrust accordingly. There 
were no cues that would indicate the problem except for the airspeed indication since the 
throttle levers did not move while in Auto Throttle (A/T). In addition, as no mode control 
panel was installed, there wasn’t any other indication of the selected reference speed in 
the cockpit, and the A/T message on the PFD mode indication area remained on all the 
time. The reduction in airspeed would continue to the point of a stall if the pilot did not 
react by disconnecting A/T and managing power manually. The aircraft was 100% 
airworthy after the pilot disconnected the A/T and restored the power to normal levels. 
6- Load Shift: The fault was simulated a load shift in the aircraft. (i.e., CG shift). The 
change in the simulated dynamic model was equivalent to moving a 1000 kg mass about 
one meter back from the original CG location. The effects were easily noticeable. A 
strong pitch down input to the control column and immediate use of the trim was required 
to maintain straight flight. The aircraft became more unstable in pitch, roll and yaw. Once 
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the aircraft was trimmed and the new flying qualities were recognized, it was possible to 
fly the approach trajectory and attempt a landing. However, if the A/T was disengaged 
and airspeed diminished, the aircraft became less and less stable, and more difficult to 
control. 
For the flight-path-oriented FCS, the faults were: 
7- FPV Horizontal Drift: When the fault occurred, the FPV slowly started to drift 
horizontally to the left. The fault is similar to the previously described fault #3 for the 
conventional FCS. The major difference is the presence of the Command-FPV. 
Discrepancies between Command-FPV and FPV will display the problem. However, 
since the drift is slow, for a period of time the pilot may try to keep the aircraft centered 
in the tunnel using the FPV. Also, the time of triggering to the time when the pilot 
definitely abandons the FPV as a reference for flying the aircraft may be dependent on 
the position in the tunnel.  
8- Aileron Deflection Reduction: The fault was similar to the aileron range reduction 
implemented for the conventional FCS (Fault #1). However, from the pilot’s perspective, 
the problem is manifested by changes in the proportionality between stick inputs and the 
distance between the FPV and Command FPV. Increasing the stick roll input does not 
increase the roll rate and turn rate, but does increase the distance between the two 
symbols, to the point where it is possible for the CFPV to reach the edges of the PFD. 
The pilot may try to force the aircraft to a roll in the desired direction by applying 
constant stick deflection, which translates to constant increase in distance between the 
CFPV and FPV symbols. Once the aircraft has slowly rolled to the desired position, the 
pilot will attempt to stop the roll, therefore, the stick is returned to the neutral position, 
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but because the CFPV is slow to respond, the aircraft does not stop rolling. The reaction 
is a constant stick deflection to the opposite side, bringing the CFPV to the opposite side 
and beginning the cycle again, leading to a series of slow oscillations in roll which can 
sometimes lead to very high bank angles. With a good understanding of the FCS, the 
pilot may realize that it is very possible to control the aircraft by keeping the CFPV on 
the side of desired roll but at a constant and short distance from the center of the PFD.  
9- FPV Drift up: This fault is similar to fault 3, but in this case the FPV drifted up, falsely 
indicating a climb. However, the CFPV is an important cue showing that the FPV may be 
having problems. It was expected a possibility that similar oscillations to fault #3 would 
be observed, but of lower amplitude, since the CFPV could be used as a cue for guidance. 
10- and 11- Additional Stick Input in Pitch and Roll: The design of these faults was 
inspired by the real problem encountered on an A320 described in chapter 1 in which a 
defective transducer in the pilot’s stick sporadically produced un-commanded rolls. To 
simulate this, a roll or pitch command was added to the input of the pilot. The pilot would 
not notice through the position of the yoke that the flight control system was receiving an 
additional command. This roll or pitch command would be the equivalent of a stick 
deflection of about 50% to one side, for a short amount of time, one or two seconds. This 
deflection was repeated at 6 seconds intervals until the end of the simulation. The pilot 
could cancel the effect of these additional fault inputs by applying yoke inputs in the 
opposite direction, thus canceling the total input to the flight control system. If the pilot 
recognizes the problem as periodic oscillations, the aircraft can be flown to a landing.  
12- Gain Change in Stability Augmentation System: The fault produced a change in the 
gains of the pitch axis of the stability augmentation system which translated to a 
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reduction of the effectiveness of the pitch control inputs, similar to a reduction in the 
elevator effectiveness. If the distances between the FPV and the CFPV became unusually 
large, the fault became evident. As with the elevator reduction effectiveness, it was 
difficult to tune the fault to allow a margin of controllability that would allow flaring for 
landing, although tunnel tracking was possible. 
2.6.3 Procedure 
As with the briefing for experiment #1, the pilot was briefed before starting experiment 
#3. Pilots were asked to fly additional approaches to the same airport, but they were 
warned that faults could occur at any time. They were also told these differences with the 
previous experiment approaches:  
1- The weather was significantly better, i.e., ceiling and visibility were unlimited, 
although light to moderate turbulence continued.  
2- Only the conventional and the flight path flight control systems were used.  
3- The motion system of the simulator was always on.  
4- The fault meter and alerting systems were occasionally available to the pilot. The 
following are the briefings given on both systems:  
Fault meter: “In half of the runs, an instrument (called the fault meter) will display the 
(lack of) health on a scale from 0 to 100. The higher the value, the worse is the severity 
of the problem. Any indication in the white arc range is normal. The yellow arc, starting 
at 60%, is considered a Caution, and the red arc, starting at 80% is considered a Warning.  
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So that we can measure how and when you use the fault feter, you will need to press a 
button in the yoke to see it: [Push-To-See]. Please use this instrument as you find it 
helpful to you.” 
Alerting system: “The alerting system will provide caution and warning alerts based on 
the same information source as the fault meter. A caution aural alert will sound and a 
message will be displayed in yellow when the fault value is over 60%. If the fault 
continues to deteriorate and the fault value goes over 80%, a warning alert will sound and 
a warning message will be displayed in red. In some runs, the alerting system will only 
give warning alerts, while on other runs, both caution and warning alerts will be given. 
Before each run, the experimenter will let you know which alerting system configuration 
you will be flying with.” The complete briefing document is included in Appendix B.  
Pilots were asked again to use their best judgment to continue or abort the approach and 
go around, as if they were flying an airliner with passengers, both in their way of 
handling the aircraft and in the overall situation. Again, it was mentioned that the A/T 
should be disconnected if any problem or unusual behavior was detected. 
The first run of the session was for training. Pilots were encouraged to repeat this run if 
they felt it was necessary, especially when more than a few days had elapsed since they 
finished experiment #1 and #2 session. During this run, both the fault meter and the 
alerting system were presented to the pilot, but no fault was triggered. The pilots then 




Each run started with the aircraft positioned in a 16 km long tunnel to the runway, 
properly configured for the approach with the autothrottle engaged. The approach 
trajectories used in these experiments were slightly more complex than the ones used 
during the previous experiments.  
The approach geometry, shown in Figure 8, had five turns and three different descent 
angles, in contrast with the three turns and two descent angles of the tunnels for 
experiments #1 and #2. In half of the runs, a fault that affected flight control was 
triggered. The faults were automatically triggered at different points during the approach 
in the different scenarios, to limit their predictability.  Special care was taken in finding 
the best point for each specific fault to ensure that the pilot would have a chance to 
recognize during its development. For example, faults that would affect the roll 
controllability were triggered before a tunnel turn, rather than during long straight 
segments. As the fault developed, the fault meter and/or alerting system (depending 
which combination was present) indicated that the overall health of the aircraft had 
deteriorated. With the exception of dealing with the faults, the pilot’s task was identical 











2.6.5 Experiment Design 
A total of 24 approaches were flown in experiment #3. The runs were blocked in 2 sets of 
12 by FCS, and the order of these blocks was varied between pilots. The 24 conditions, 
each replicated once by each pilot, were defined by 2 FCS x 2 fault/no fault x 2 fault 
meter x 3 alerting system. Within the fault conditions, 12 different faults were 
implemented, each seen only once by each pilot. The faults were randomly assigned 
within each block: faults 1 through 6 for the conventional FCS and 7 to 12 for the Flight 
Path FCS. 
All combinations of alerting system and fault meter were used. The fault meter was either 
present or not, and the alerting system had one phase, two phases or was not present at 
all. The assignment of faults to the conditions was balanced between pilots to mitigate 
any impact on the dependent measures. The complete experiment design is included in 
Appendix C. 
2.6.6 Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables for experiment #3 are: (1) approach outcomes, described in four 
different categories: immediate go around, continued approach (but not landed), landing, 
and others (including simulator software or hardware problems, simulator automatic stop, 
etc.); (2) pilot’s written descriptions of the faults and confidence levels of their 
descriptions; (3) pilots’ written comments on the use of the alerting system and fault 
meter; (4) use of the fault meter measured through Push-To-See button; (5) NASA TLX 
Task Load Index (Rating Scales Only); and (6) pilot tunnel tracking performance. 
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2.7 Experiment #4 Description 
2.7.1  Objective 
The objective of this experiment was to investigate the possibility of automation bias in 
pilots’ responses to a false alarm from the HMS. 
2.7.2  Experiment Conditions 
After the 24 runs for experiment #3, pilots were not aware they were transitioning to 
experiment #4, which consisted of a single last run. At some point during the approach, a 
false alarm was indicated both by the fault meter and the 2-phase alerting system. All 
experimental conditions remained constant from the previous experiment, except for the 
false alarm. The aircraft, systems and displays operated normally during the approach, 
before and after the false alarm was triggered. 
Since the previous experiment was blocked by FCS and the blocks were randomly varied 
between pilots, the FCS used for the last block of experiment #3 was used for experiment 
#4. Therefore, six pilots flew experiment #4 with the conventional FCS, while the other 
six used the Flight Path FCS.  
2.7.3  Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables for experiment #4 are: (1) approach outcomes, described in four 
different categories: immediate go around, continued approach (but not landed), landing, 
and others (including simulator software or hardware problems, simulator automatic stop, 
etc.); and (2) pilots’ questionnaire answers and comments. 
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3 Experiment Results 
Multiple analyses were performed on the data from the four experiments. The results 
presented in this chapter are those most relevant to the research hypotheses and thus are 
primarily focused on experiments #2, #3 and #4. The motivation and objectives of 
experiment #1 are not the focus of this thesis. Its description was included in this 
dissertation because it served as training for the pilots in the simulator for the 
experiments of interest here. Analysis and results of experiment #1 can be found in 
Mulder et al. (2003). 
The total number of approaches flown by all pilots was 12 for experiment #2, 264 for 
experiment #3 and 12 for experiment #4, but some files were not available or used for 
data analysis. For experiment #2, 92% of the data (11 approaches) was available for 
analysis; one file was lost due to a simulator setup problem. For experiment #3, 98% of 
the data (281 approaches) was available: Only 7 data runs were lost, 6 of them placebo 
runs in which no faults were introduced. The data for experiment #4 was 92% complete 
with only 1 data run out of 12 not flown. 
After each run, a subjective workload assessment was performed using a simplified 
NASA TLX Task Load Index, in which ratings for six different sources of load were 
requested. Due to the limited time between experiment runs, the TLX weights measures 
were not collected in the experiment.  
In addition to the TLX ratings, the pilots were asked to answer a set of questions specific 
to each run. After each experiment, another questionnaire with more general and 
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demographic questions was presented to the pilots. All questionnaires are included in 
Appendix D. 
 
3.1 Experiment #2 Results 
3.1.1 Objective 
The objective of the experiment was to observe pilot’s response to an unexpected fault 
affecting flight control. This data also provided a control for experiment #3 in which 
pilots were briefed to expect faults and problems.  
3.1.2 Collected Data 
From the original 12 runs, data from 11 runs were successfully recorded. Pilot #9’s file 
was lost due to a simulator setup problem. 76 parameters from simulator data were 
recorded at 25 Hz; in addition, subjective questionnaires were presented to the pilots after 
each run. 
3.1.3 Analysis Methods and Results 
During this experiment, a FCS fault was triggered during the approach. The fault reduced 
the motion ranges of the aerodynamic control surfaces. The severity of the fault was 
originally designed such that pitch and roll rates would be significantly reduced, but not 
enough to compromise the total control of the aircraft could be maintained. 
The impact of the fault in the operation of the aircraft at a mission level can be observed 
in the outcome of the approach. The different possible outcomes of an approach are 
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“landing”, “continuing approach with later go around”, “immediate go around” and 
“other (crash, simulator problems, etc)”. To determine the outcome, the first step was to 
observe the last position of the aircraft. When the aircraft was at 0 ft and over the runway, 
it was considered a landing. The flare and landing was not analyzed; from the 
experimenter’s observations, the landings were mostly considered as acceptable for 
normal aircraft operations.  If the aircraft did not reach the runway, several other 
situations could have occurred. This required a more detailed study of the trajectory and 
other performance parameters. Plots of the vertical and horizontal aircraft positions with 
respect to the tunnel provided a good insight on situation and probable intentions of the 
pilot.  
The next indication that helped categorize the outcome was the autothrottle 
disconnection. As mentioned before, the pilots were briefed to disconnect the autothrottle 
when reaching 500 ft (to bleed airspeed for the landing) or when they felt that something 
was abnormal.  
Based on this categorization and an analysis of the simulator data, some issues with the 
experiment #2 simulator setup were discovered: during the approach flown by the first 
pilot, the fault was unexpectedly triggered only a few seconds after the start, instead of at 
the preset point at about 4000m down the tunnel. In addition, it was observed that the 
fault was not severe enough to have an impact on the aircraft handling, allowing the pilot 
to land without much effort. Corrections were made and the fault severity was increased 
to achieve the desired effects. After this correction, no pilot could land the aircraft, and 
all runs ended with imminent crashes. The severity was then changed again after run #5. 
For unknown reasons, the severity of the faults was changed several times during the 
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remaining of the runs with significant impact on the outcomes of the approaches. Table 2 
shows the parameters used to define the severity of the fault. These parameters are 
directly related to the maximum control surface deflection allowed after the fault was 
triggered.  
Table 2 - Aileron and elevator severity parameters and approach outcome. 
Pilot FCS Aileron Elevator Outcome 
1 3 0.030 0.042 Landing 
2 1 0.018 0.027 Crash 
3 2 0.018 0.027 Crash 
4 2 0.018 0.027 Crash 
5 3 0.018 0.027 Crash 
6 1 0.025 0.036 Landing 
7 3 0.018 0.027 Crash 
8 2 0.060 0.083 Landing 
9 - - - - 
10 2 0.030 0.083 Go-Around 
11 3 0.018 0.027 Crash 
12 1 0.020 0.048 Landing 
 
The lower the parameter, the smaller the aileron or elevator deflection range and the more 
difficult to control the aircraft. The effect of the fault parameters, and therefore the fault 
severity, on the outcome of the approaches is evident. The elevator fault severity 
appeared to determine the outcome. No pilot could land the aircraft when the elevator 
parameter value was lower than 0.036. The pilot’s comments on the questionnaire also 
confirm the substantial difference in the situations. Table 3 shows the answers to 
Question A: “What do you think happened?” and Question B: “How sure are you about 
your previous answer?” In three cases, when the fault was not severe and a landing was 
possible, the abnormal behavior was blamed on “gusts” and “wind shear” (Pilot 1, 6 and 







Table 3 - Subjective questionnaire responses. 
Pilot Outcome What do you think happened? How sure are you? 
1 Landing Sort of abnormal gusts 1 
2 Crash Overshot the tunnel and tried to correct. Result was not realistic. I think a control problem occurred. 6 
3 Crash Steering failure 1 
4 Crash 
I’m really not sure. It seems like a malfunction of the control 
computer. I felt like the control wheel commands weren’t 
properly transferred to the FCS anymore. I have the feeling that 
the FPA was still indicating correctly. 
4 
5 Crash I turned a bit steep and tried to correct. At first, the a/c reacted, but then the roll channel did not correspond to my inputs 9 
6 Landing Wind shear from the left 7 
7 Crash I have no idea, some severe degradation of FBW. 7 
8 Landing Wind shear; engine failure 7 
9 - N/A N/A 
10 Go-Around FCS failure 7 
11 Crash No reaction to my inputs, or with a very large delay 3 
12 Landing 
Flight control/ hydraulic problem. If aircraft roll rate error was 
½ roll rate: sim fail. Pitch ok. Roll: more aileron needed for 






It is evident that the outcomes were dependent on the severity of the fault, both from the 
simulator data and from the subjective data. Pilot comments confirm that the situations 
were significantly different when aileron and elevator range restrictions were changed, 
although the results still represent the variation in perceptions. An analysis of the 
comments and the approach outcomes showed that pilots who managed to land the 
aircraft attributed the problem to external causes (windshear, gusts) in three out of four 
cases. On the other hand, all other cases in which the aircraft could not be landed were 
associated with system problems.  
Another interesting aspect of the variations of responses is “how sure” they were of their 
answers. For example, pilot #1 landed the aircraft in what he thought were “abnormal 
gusts”, but he was just guessing. In contrast, pilot #6, who also managed to land the 
aircraft and blamed the problem to windshear, was “almost sure” about the cause.  
3.2 Experiment #3 Results 
3.2.1 Objectives 
The objective of this experiment was, first, to understand how pilots respond to faults that 
are novel or are not detected by the standard alerting and monitoring systems. 
Understanding this response is essential to the design of systems, procedures and 
techniques that could aid the pilots in managing problems with the aircraft. Among the 
options to support the pilots in these situations are systems that could provide general 
information about the health of the aircraft. Therefore, the second objective of this 
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experiment was to investigate how an HMS as described in 1.3 can help the pilots detect 
and manage the faults. In addition, the experiment was to investigate the effect of 
different methods for displaying HMS information to the pilot (alerting system vs. fault 
meter). 
3.2.2 Collected Data 
Of the planned 288 approaches, a total of 281 approaches were flown. One data set was 
lost, and six other runs were not flown because the experiment was delayed and the pilot 
had to leave at the originally scheduled time. However, this was anticipated and the six 
approaches not flown did not have faults. 
As with all the other experiments, 76 aircraft parameters were recorded at 25Hz, 
including aircraft position and altitude, both with respect to the tunnel and to a reference 
frame centered in the runway touchdown zone. 
Questionnaires were collected after each of the 281 approach was flown. Each included 
several questions regarding the fault, the alerting system and fault meter, and NASA TLX 
workload ratings. 
3.2.3 Approach Outcomes 
3.2.3.1 Analysis Method 
The categories used to describe the outcomes of each approach of experiment #2 were 
used again in experiment #3. The four categories are: 
1. Landing 
2. Continued approach with later go around 
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3. Immediate go around  
4. Others (crash, simulator problem, situation too ambiguous) 
The “landing” category was the easiest to assign, based on a simple observation at the last 
position of the aircraft. The “continued approach” category included all situations in 
which the aircraft continued the tunnel tracking after the fault was fully developed, but 
ultimately conducted a go around or needed the simulator to be stopped. An “immediate 
go around” included all situations in which there is no evidence of intended tunnel 
tracking during or after the fault development. The “others” category included situations 
in which the outcome was influenced by known external factors, or when the pilot 
requested to stop the simulation without establishing a go around attitude. It was decided 
to keep this category included in the analysis because it can be argued that pilots’ 
performance or behaviors led to some of those outcomes.  
Figure 9 shows how the situation was analyzed for a particular approach in this example. 
In this example, fault #1, an elevator problem, was triggered at about 10 km from the 
runway threshold. The pilot recognized the fault, disconnected the A/T as requested in 
the briefing and continued to fly the approach. However, as he approached the airfield, 
his tunnel tracking performance declined and became too unstable for the landing; he 



































The go around confirmed by a constant climb pitch attitude, full throttle, and the 
abandoning of the tunnel. (In some many cases, also the horizontal tunnel tracking 
provided useful information. Therefore, a plan view of the aircraft trajectory was also 
plotted for each approach.) The overall situation and the approach category assigned was 
also compared to the pilots’ comments collected in the questionnaires for that particular 
run. In most cases, the comments are coherent with the observed position, attitude and 
performance parameters. 
Initially, the A/T disconnection was used as means to determine when the pilot had 
detected the fault. It was later decided that in many cases pilots may have forgotten to 
disconnect the A/T, even if they recognized a problem with the aircraft and decided to 
continue the approach. For example, consider the situation shown in Figure 10: After the 
problem was triggered, the tunnel tracking performance seems to deteriorate but not 
enough for the pilot to consider going around. The A/T was disconnected at 500 ft, as 
briefed for a normal approach, and the aircraft landed without problem. From the 
information available, it can not be determined if the pilot was aware of the fault, and if 
so, when he became aware. Also affecting the A/T measure was the pilot’s disconnection 
as a response to the alerting system or fault meter instead to the perception of a problem. 
This type of response can be observed in some approaches in which fault #5 was 































Figure 10 - Example of aircraft approach trajectory and flight path vector problem. 
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When this occurred, pilots reported having no idea about what triggered the alerts or even 
suggested a false alarm. Another issue that made it difficult to categorize the outcomes in 
greater detail was the possible experimenter’s intervention in some cases when the 
simulator hardware could have been compromised by severe motion requirements. Many 
precautions were taken to avoid reaching full extension of the hydraulic actuators. If a 
pilot managed to put the aircraft in a situation of excessive and abrupt load factors (high 
or low g), the simulator was stopped automatically or by the operator. 
3.2.3.2 Results 
The complete approach outcome categorization of 143 runs for the twelve faults is shown 
in Figure 11. At least one pilot could land each fault with the exception of fault #8, in 
which an aileron deflection reduction fault was triggered with the Command-FPV FCS. 
This fault did not completely compromise the controllability of the aircraft, although 
maneuverability was very low. It is probable that landing was possible by disregarding 
the tunnel and aligning the aircraft with the runway using the navigation display, but it 
would have required several large radius turns taking several minutes. At least one pilot 
suggested or started to fly using this technique to return for a landing, but, since there was 
not useful data to collect from this maneuver and the experiments were tightly scheduled, 
the experimenter/copilot suggested stopping the run.  
In contrast with fault #8, pilots landed the aircraft in 34 of 36 runs when presented with 
fault #3, #7 and #9, in which malfunction of sensors would cause a drift of the FPV, 
either up, down or to the left. The effects of this fault can be observed in pilots’ tunnel 
tracking performance which deteriorated at some point during the approaches, such as the 
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example shown in Figure 10. Evidently, when the discrepancy between the FPV 
indication and the aircraft’s attitude was obvious, almost all pilots disregarded the FPV 
and flew the aircraft using other display references.  
Without considering faults #3, #7 and #9, 107 approached in which a fault was triggered 
were flown. 35% resulted in landings, 36% continued the approach but did not land, 22% 
went around immediately and the remaining 7% was categorized as “other”. For most of 
the other faults, responses were varied, both between faults and between pilots and no 
other universal trends were observed for the outcomes of the approaches. 
3.2.4 Health Information Effect on Approach Outcomes 
The impact of information about the health of the aircraft on the outcomes of the 
approaches was investigated. For these tests, faults #3, #7 and #9 (FPV drift) were 
excluded because 34 out of 36 pilots landed the aircraft, implying that the faults were 
easily recognized and the effect of the HMS information had little influence. 
The hypothesis that HMS information could help the pilots with fault management was 
tested by examining the effect of different fault meter and alerting system combinations 
on the approach outcomes.  A Chi-Square test for independence between the six fault 
meter and alerting system combinations was applied to the four outcome categories. As 
the test for independence failed to provide conclusions due to the low number of data 
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1- Elevator Deflection Reduction
2- Aileron Deflection Reduction
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Landed Continued Approach Immediate G/A Other
 
Figure 11 - Approach outcomes, pilot responses to faults and their outcomes. 
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Meaningful results were only achieved with two factors: A- No Information Available or 
B- Information available (either from the alerting system, fault meter or both). The 
corresponding contingency table is shown in Table 4. 
Table 4 - Contingency table for two HMS information factors. 
 Landed Continued G/A Other  
A - No Information 8 7 3 0  
B - FM and/or A.S. 29 32 21 7  
Totals: 37 39 24 7 107 
 
Table 4 contains 2 cells with expected counts less than 5, which is more than 20% of the 
total number of cells. But, since the P-Value of 0.497 is very large, the probability of 
finding any effect of the factors on the approach outcomes is very small. To further 
investigate the subject, another test on Table 4 was performed but the “other” column 
was discarded. 
In this case, 16% of the cells have expected counts less than 5. Therefore, the P-Value 
can be used to accept the null hypothesis of independence. In other words, there is no 
evidence to conclude that the HMS information had any effect on the outcomes of the 
approaches. 
3.2.5 Pilot Descriptions of the Faults 
After each run, whether or not a fault was triggered, a questionnaire was presented to the 
pilot by the experimenter/copilot. The first question was “What do you think happened?”  
In 100% of the approaches in which no fault was triggered, pilots answered “Nothing”. In 
a few cases pilots added some comments regarding their performance or the aircraft’s 
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behavior. When faults were triggered, a mixture of answers was given which was sorted 
into the following categories with respect to how well they described the fault: 
1. Wrong answer (non existent fault description). 
2. No idea (pilot declared having no answer). 
3. Acceptable comment (comments that are not incorrect but do not describe the 
problem symptom). 
4. Recognition of symptom (comment precisely describes the symptom of the problem). 
5. Mention possible cause or detailed description of symptoms (comments not only 
describe the symptom but also propose possible causes of the problem). 
These categories are also organized in an increasing order of pilot’s understanding of the 
problem, ranging from 1 for “Wrong answer” to 5 for “Attempt to explain cause of 
problem or detailed description of symptoms”.  
The categorization showed that in 11% of the approaches the pilots did not have a correct 
understanding of the fault. In at least 76% of the runs, the pilots recognized the 
symptoms. If the “acceptable comments” are considered as an indication that the pilot 
was aware of the problem, the pilots of 89% of the runs can be considered to have had 
awareness of the degradation of health of the aircraft. The results of categorizing all 
answers are summarized in Figure 12 and in Figure 13 by pilots. It is interesting to note 
that the distribution of these answers is relatively uniform between pilots and faults, with 
one exception: Pilot #2 seemed to have made less effort than the rest in answering the 
questionnaire, as can be observed in Figure 13. With respect to the faults, only one of 
them caused more confusion than the others: the static port blockage which affected 




The following question on the questionnaire was: “How sure are you about your previous 
question?” The answer was requested on a 9 step scale from 1 (Just Guessing) to 9 (Very 
Sure). The responses for the categories Wrong Guess, Acceptable Comment, and 
Mention Possible Cause were centered on the mid-point, while Recognition of Symptom 
and Mention Possible Causes tended to have higher ratings. A Wilcoxon Rank Sum test 
found that pilots that correctly identified the symptoms showed a higher confidence in 
their answers than pilots who attempted an even more detailed explanation of the 
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Figure 14 - Pilot's confidence on their answer to “What do you think happened?” 
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3.2.6 Pilots’ Experience 
Other measures for which pilot experience could have had an effect were approach 
outcomes, tunnel tracking performance, TLX measures, and fault meter and alerting 
system use and ratings. No correlation between any of these measures and the pilots’ 
experience was found. Similar conclusions were obtained in a study by Davis and 
Pritchett (1999), in which twelve helicopter pilots with experiences ranging from 440 to 
6800 hours were presented with faults and failures while flying a UH-60 helicopter 
simulator equipped with an experimental alerting system. The authors did not find any 
indications that pilot experience affected on use of a novel alerting system. 
3.2.7 Pilot Comments on Fault Meter and Alerting System 
At the end of all runs in which faults were triggered, pilots were asked to rate the 
statement “The fault meter and/or alerting system helped to detect the fault”. Pilots 
provided an answer by rating the statement on a scale from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 9 
(Strongly Agree). The mean of the numeric value associated with their answer and the 
standard error was calculated for four different categories: the first two are in reference to 
the alerting system or fault meter when each was the only source of information. The 
other two are in reference to the alerting system or fault meter when both sources where 
available in the cockpit. The mean was calculated from the post run questionnaires 
corresponding to the 117 approaches with these systems present and a fault. The results 
from this analysis were compared with the answers of similar questions asked to each 
pilot at the end of the experiment.  
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When only the fault meter was present, its mean rating was 5.5 (Neutral - Slightly 
Agree). When only the alerting system was present, pilots rated its usefulness higher, 
with a mean rating of 6.4 (Slightly Agree – Agree). Having both systems available did 
not significantly change their ratings of each. Figure 15 shows the results for the fault 
meter and alerting system when rated individually (AS and FM) and when rated 
simultaneously (AS+[FM] and FM+[AS]). These same results are shown in Figure 16 for 
each pilot. Nine pilots ranked the alerting system as more useful than the fault meter and 
only pilots #6, #7 and #11 gave the opposite rating. 
An analysis of the ratings given after each fault showed that 11 out of 12 pilots were 
consistent in their answers in the questionnaires given after each run and at the end of the 
experiment. On the other hand, pilot #11 contradicted himself by repeatedly rating the 
alerting system higher after each approach but giving the opposite rating at the end of the 
experiment; this pilot may have misinterpreted the question on the final questionnaire. 




































Figure 15 – Fault meter and alerting system end of run questionnaire answers. 
 

































Figure 16 - Fault meter and alerting system overall ratings by pilot. 
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3.2.8 Use of the Fault Meter 
The use of the fault meter was investigated from the use of the “Push to See” button by 
which the pilot made the fault meter visible. It is assumed that each time the button was 
pressed and the fault meter became available, the pilot scanned the instrument. The use of 
the fault meter was analyzed at three different phases: before, during and after the fault. 
Since the faults were implemented such that they would gradually develop, the “during” 
phases included the 15 seconds after the faults were triggered; after this period of time, 
the faults were fully developed. The measures obtained from the fault meter use were the 
number of times the button was depressed and the total time the button was pressed. The 
second measure, total time the button was depressed, divided by total number of button 
presses gives an indication of how much time the pilot had the display available each 
time he wanted to see it. The same measures used for the approaches with faults were 
also taken from all approaches in which no fault was triggered. This allowed obtaining 
measurements in the same conditions and time period: one full approach. 
The fault meter scans/time per pilot before, during and after the fault was triggered, is 
shown in Figure 17. Only pilot #6 and #7 used the fault meter at a higher rate before than 
during the fault, corresponding with their questionnaire answers and fault meter and 
































Six pilots (50%) used the fault meter at higher rates before the fault than after the fault. 
Three (25%) pilots did not change the rate of scans of the fault meter before and after, 
and the other 3 used the fault meter more during and after the fault than before. Nine 
(75%) pilots used the fault meter at higher rates during the 15 seconds in which the fault 
was developing.  
The total time the fault meter was held down by each pilot during approaches with no 
faults is shown in Figure 18. The average total time was less than 5 seconds for 66% of 
the pilots, and less than 10 for 92% of the pilots. The exception is Pilot #6, with an 
average of 37 seconds, confirming his unique behavior of fault meter use. It is also 
interesting to consider the fault meter availability in the context of the total duration of 
each approach, usually around 3 minutes and 30 seconds. In average, the fault meter was 
visible approximately between 2% and 5% of the approach time by 11 of the pilots, while 
for pilot #6, the fault meter was visible during 20% of the time. The fault meter was 
available in 6 of the 12 faults seen by a pilot. In four of these approaches, the alerting 
system was present and gave alerts as described in 2.3.4. Table 5 lists the number of 
scans of the fault meter on all approaches where no fault occurred, in two main 
categories: with alerting system, and without. The presence of an alerting system did not 
seem to affect the number of scans of the fault meter, indicating their independent use of 
the instrument. Pilot #1 did not fly some of the placebo runs due to a schedule problem, 





Table 5 - Scans of fault meter with and without alerting system. 
Pilot 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
4 14 3 6 18 105 6 5 0 0 1 8 Without 
AS 4 24 3 5 6 85 10 2 2 1 1 16 
                          
3 0 3 2 13 86 6 4 0 1 0 7 
n/a 18 3 4 7 90 7 3 2 0 1 13 
n/a 2 1 6 8 67 10 2 0 2 1 7 
With AS 





















































Total time that Fault-Meter was available (PTS button depressed) on runs with no fault
 
Figure 18 – Total time of fault meter available to pilot 
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3.2.9 Pilot Workload Rating 
At the end of each run, pilots also described their workload using the 0-100 NASA TLX 
workload rating for each of the following measures: 
a. physical demand 
b. mental demand 
c. temporal demand 
d. performance 
e. effort 
f. frustration  
Appendix D includes the questionnaire in which these measures were presented to the 
pilot. These six workload ratings were examined effects of different factors with an 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). The factors investigated were “pilot”, “fault”, “run” 
(run order), “FCS”, “alert” (alerting system) and “fault meter”. Observations with 
standard residuals greater than 3.5 were discarded. 
The two different Flight Control Systems had effects on all measures except for 
Frustration, although P-value was marginal (0.066). The fault meter and alerting system 
did not have any effect on the TLX measures. The only other factor that affected any of 
the measures was “Frustration” (P=0.008), which diminished with run order, meaning 
that as pilots flew more approaches and encountered new faults, the reported 



















Main Effects Plot - Data Means for Frustration
 
Figure 19 – Main effect plot from ANOVA analysis for “Frustation”. 
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3.2.10 Pilot Performance at Tracking the Tunnel 
3.2.10.1 Analysis Methods 
The approaches to the fictitious airport were flown using the primary flight display 
shown in Figure 4, a three-dimensional ego-centric presentation in which a ground-
referenced tunnel was displayed over a presentation of the outside world. The width and 
height of the tunnel was 45m x 45m and the pilot had to fly the aircraft flying as close as 
possible to the center of the tunnel until reaching the runway. The tunnel tracking error 
was defined as the distance in meters at any given time from the aircraft’s cockpit to the 
tunnel’s “walls”, “ceiling” or “floor”. The error was automatically measured by the 
simulator at 25 Hz, in two dimensions, horizontal and vertical. The Root Mean Square 
(RMS) of the errors was calculated for each dimension.  An ANOVA was done on the 
tunnel tracking error for the approaches without faults only to investigate the effect of the 
following factors: Run (run order), FCS, fault meter (presence of) and alerting system 
(presence of).  
As expected, the tunnel tracking performance was found to be affected by the different 
flight control systems. However, this effect was only observed in the horizontal error. 
The two flight control systems helped the pilot to better track the center of the tunnel. 
There is no evidence that the presence of the alerting system, fault meter or the run order 
had any effect on the tracking error.  
The horizontal tunnel tracking error for each pilot and FCS is shown in Figure 20. Fifty 
percent of the pilots clearly performed better with the Command-FPV system, although 
considering the width of the tunnel the difference does not have any impact in the 
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accomplishment of the task.  Figure 21 shows the vertical tunnel tracking error, in which 
3 pilots did better with FCS 3 and 4 pilots did better with FCS1. The data for the 
remaining 5 pilots did not show significant difference between the two FCS due to the 
overlapping standard errors. 
The effect of the faults on tunnel tracking performance is shown in Figure 22. The 
analysis was performed only on runs in which the outcome was a landing or the aircraft 
reached the end of the tunnel, at about 200 ft of altitude and 3500 ft from the touchdown 
zone. Out of 144, 79 approaches met with this requirement. Faults of the FPV (#3, #7 and 
#9) showed particularly low impact on the tracking performance. On the other hand, the 
fault reducing aileron deflection with FCS 3 (Fault #8) severely affected tunnel tracking 




Figure 20 – Horizontal tunnel tracking error (RMS, meters). 
 
 























































Figure 22 – Tunnel tracking error before and after the fault.  
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3.3 Experiment #4 Results 
3.3.1 Objective 
In this experiment responses to a false alarm were investigated. The hypothesis was that 
the use of the HMS during experiment #3 would induce automation bias on the system, 
affecting fault management and tunnel tracking performance. 
3.3.2  Pilots’ Responses to False Alarms 
Ten out of twelve of the originally planned approaches were flown for experiment #4, all 
resulting in landings. After the run pilots were asked, as in all previous approaches with 
faults, “what do you think happened?” The responses are categorized in Table 6, 
indicating that at least 50% of the pilots could not identify any problem, however, 
indicated that something was wrong.  
To investigate the effects of the fault meter and the alerting system on tunnel tracking 
performance, a comparison between the tracking error during the placebo runs of 
experiment #3 and the error on the runs of experiment #4 was performed. Figure 23 and 
Figure 24 show the Root Mean Square for horizontal and vertical error. An ANOVA 
found a marginally significant difference in tunnel tracking error before and after the 





Table 6 - Pilot descriptions after the false alarm. 
# of Pilots Description 
5 “Something is wrong” but couldn’t identify what 
2 “False Alarm” 
2 “Don’t Know” 
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4 Discussion and Conclusions 
The experiments described in this dissertation provide an insight into pilot fault 
management, including the role of a proposed new health monitoring system. The 
discussion covers two main topics: fault management and the role, problems and 
potential uses of the alerting system and fault management system. 
4.1 Fault Management 
Fault management is modeled as four operational tasks: detection, diagnosis, prognosis, 
and compensation. These four tasks were shown in Figure 1, superimposed on 
Rasmussen’s “decision ladder”. In addition, fault management can occur at three 
different operational levels: systems, aircraft and mission. In the context of this fault 
management model, these experiments did not provide the pilots means to respond to 
faults in the systems operational level. Instead, faults would have to be compensated for 
at the aircraft level, and, in many cases, they would trigger fault management at the 
mission level. It was observed nevertheless that pilots also attempted fault management at 
the systems level. Immediately after the approach, pilots were asked “What do you think 
just happened?” 18% of the pilots not only described the problem symptoms, but 
attempted to explain the causes. These answers clearly show that pilots may start their 
fault management at the system level, without being able to compensate at that level.  
Likewise, a significant percentage of pilots that could not precisely define the fault 
symptoms, admitted having “no idea” of what the problem was, or provided wrong 
descriptions of the faults. The answers categorized as “wrong guess” have to be 
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interpreted with prudence, since some pilots may have recognized the symptoms but 
provided a wrong explanation of possible causes. The “no idea” answers are self 
explanatory. But, when pilots answered with an “acceptable” comment, it could not be 
determined if their situation awareness was sufficient to compensate for the fault. In 
summary, at least 19% of the answers showed the pilot’s difficulties describing, 
recognizing or identifying the problem.  
Of the three operational levels, pilots had the most complex task at the aircraft level. All 
faults were designed to affect flight control and required a response to continue tracking 
the tunnel. The type of response corresponds to three different categories of faults. The 
first category corresponds to the four faults manifested in the cockpit flight displays. 
Three of them affected the displayed flight path vector and could be compensated for by 
ignoring the displayed discrepancy and tracking the tunnel using other primary flight 
display cues. The fourth display fault was caused by a blocked static port. Compensation 
for this fault required the pilot to completely disregard the primary flight display and fly 
the aircraft visually, managing airspeed based on pitch and power performance 
experience. (This fault also affected the mission level since pilots had to visually find the 
airport.) 
The second category corresponds to two faults which could be completely compensated 
for by using aircraft systems.  First, the weight shift could be compensated by the use of 
elevator trim to reduce the forward pressure needed to keep the aircraft in the tunnel, 
although pitch remained unusually unstable. Second, the autothrottle failure could be 
compensated by disconnecting it and regaining manual throttle control. (This is the only 
fault in which the response partially occurs at system level.) 
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The third category corresponds to the rest of the faults, in which compensation required 
new “stick and rudder” strategies to maintain control of the aircraft. These faults required 
a constant effort from the pilot because their effect on flight control could not be 
eliminated.  
Just as pilots’ descriptions of the faults give an insight of the fault management at the 
system and aircraft level, the outcome of each approach during experiment #3 shows how 
the responses of the fault happened at the aircraft level or cascaded into the mission level.  
Results show that pilots were cautious in evaluating the possibility of aborting the 
approach. For example, faults affecting the FPV did not seem to have affected the 
approach at the mission level, since in 34 out of 36 runs the pilots landed, even when the 
alerting system or fault meter was indicating a problem. However, considering the rest of 
the faults, 35% of the runs resulted in landings, and in another 36% pilots did not 
immediately abort the approach and continued to track the tunnel. Only in 22% of the 
runs an immediate go around was initiated. If landing a with certain fault proved to be 
possible as demonstrated by some pilots, why did other pilots decide to abort the 
approach? These results confirm that this decision is highly subjective 
Finally, examining experiment #2, it is interesting to note how pilots described a 
sometimes almost unnoticed, sometimes catastrophic problem. In all cases in which pilots 
loss control of the aircraft or managed to go around, their comments directly point to the 
FCS failure. However, in the four cases where severity was low and pilots had little 
difficulty in landing, three comments referred to windshear. This contrast with the results 
of experiment #3, in which faults were attributed to aircraft system problems and not to 
environmental or operational factors such as windshear, icing or deficient load 
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management (center of gravity problems). Pilots’ briefings to expect faults may have 
affected their answers.  
4.2 Fault Meter and Alerting System 
What was the role of HMS information in the fault management process? First, subjective 
data shows that pilots generally agreed that the fault meter and alerting system helped 
them somewhat to detect the fault.  In addition, 10 out of 12 pilots scanned the fault 
meter before the faults, using it as a monitoring tool aiding in detection. The presence of 
the alerting system did not affect the use of the fault meter, suggesting that pilots could 
have thought of both systems as independent, instead of considering them as 
complementary. 
In general, most pilots preferred the alerting system over the fault meter. This preference 
was not only expressed in the questionnaires after each approach but was also confirmed 
when a similar question was asked at the end of the experiments. These pilots also had 
the fault meter uncovered, on average, about 5% of the approach duration. All pilots 
scanned the fault meter at much higher rates during the period of 15 seconds after the 
faults were triggered. This trend was observed in the 10 out of 12 pilots who used the 
fault meter the most before the fault, even for pilots #10 and #11 who did not use the 
fault meter at all before the fault. 
However, two pilots preferred the fault meter over the alerting system and were seen to 
use it more before the faults. One of the pilots may have developed a strategy to take 
advantage of its continuous presentation of the aircraft health information; he had the 
fault meter uncovered about 20% of the total approach duration. 
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Did the presence of the HMS information affect the pilot’s workload? NASA’s Task 
Load Index ratings used in the post run questionnaires did not show any effect by the 
fault meter or alerting system. The only workload effect was with “frustration”, which 
was found to diminish with run order. It is believed that, as the pilots got used to the 
experiment scenarios, dealing with the faults became an interesting challenge instead of a 
frustrating experience. Likewise, tunnel tracking performance (TTP) was analyzed in 
experiment #3 and #4 to investigate the effects of the fault meter and alerting system. 
ANOVA found no effects due to the presence of HMS information in the approaches 
without faults in experiment #3. However, ANOVA of tunnel tracking performance in 
experiment #4’s false alarm cases finds the difference “before” and “after” to be 
marginally significant, (p=0.1, n=10). This difference may be attributed to two different 
reasons. First, the fault meter may have triggered a fault management process, increasing 
cognitive workload to deal with the new situation and taking resources shared with the 
tunnel tracking task, consequently affecting the performance. Second, it can be 
conjectured that the observed deterioration in the measure may have been caused by the 
pilot purposefully testing out the aircraft controllability, thus deviating from the tunnel 
temporarily. 
In the questionnaires during and after the experiments, pilots repeatedly “complained” 
about the under-specific information provided by the fault meter or alerting system (e.g. 
“I need to know WHAT is wrong”). Their comments suggested that at least which axis 
(pitch, roll or yaw) was affected may be more helpful. Although the pilots’ comments are 
valid, they put in evidence that the briefing may not have provided sufficient guidance for 
using the HMS, suggesting that pilot training would be required.  
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Potentially, procedures may be developed to help pilots use HMS information. It is a 
natural tendency for pilots to operate at a rule-based level, although the use of rule-base 
processing applied in the wrong context could present serious disadvantages. Thus, 
procedures may best serve to partially structure and encourage knowledge based 
reasoning by suggesting diagnostic processes to consider, rather than exactly specifying 
actions to be performed by rote.  
Could the HMS initiate fault management at the mission level? The fault meter and 
alerting system had little effect on the approach outcomes with the faults used here 
(although the scenarios already allowed for an immediate landing whether the false alarm 
was believed or not). However, responses at the mission level may be independent of the 
HMS information, but dependent on the outcome of fault management at aircraft level. 
For example, a false alarm may trigger fault management at systems and aircraft level, 
but should the crew fail to find any problem, they may decide to abort the flight as a 
precautionary measure. 
The results obtained from experiment #4 give significant insight into the pilots’ responses 
to a false alarm (or a case when the fault symptoms remain invisible to the crew). The 
tendency toward automation bias is clearly seen in the pilots’ responses to the post flight 
questionnaires. More than 50% of the pilots declared “something is wrong”; one pilot 
even described a non existent fault. Only 2 pilots out of 11 recognized the false alarm. 
This result has to be considered in context: experiment #3 had just provided 20 
approaches in which the reliability of the fault meter and alerting system was 100% and 
pilot detection of the fault was very high. Thus, remains open the question of how pilots 
would respond to the fault meter during normal operations when faults are rare. 
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4.3 Overall Insights 
The experiments provided valuable insight into the fault management processes in the 
cockpit environment. The results confirm the hypothesis that responses to faults 
degrading flight control will vary significantly between and within pilots. The response 
variation was observed not only at the mission level, where decisions proved to be highly 
subjective, but also at the aircraft level, where responses needed to compensate for the 
fault were specific. 
The HMS information proved to be helpful in several ways. Both the alerting system and 
the fault meter played a role in the detection process. In addition, the fault meter was used 
to confirm a problem detected by other means or as a source for feedback of the 
compensation strategy. Both uses support the hypothesis that HMS information can help 
pilots in the fault management. 
Pilots’ preferences of HMS interfaces were not uniform, suggesting that some pilots did 
develop scanning strategies to take advantage of the fault meter. This supports the notion 
that training and procedures may be necessary to assure pilots’ effective use of the HMS 
information.  
None of the six NASA TLX workload measures appear to be affected by the presence of 
the fault meter or alerting system. Likewise, tunnel tracking performance seemed to be 
momentarily affected after the trigger of an alarm, but this could be attributed to the pilot 
trying to detect or diagnose the fault by changing his control behavior. Finally, the 
triggering of a false alarm showed the existence of automation bias induced after a small 
number of interactions with the HMS. 
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4.4 Further Research 
The Health Monitoring System concept has never been applied in the cockpit. Could this 
system actually provide the information as assumed in this study? Further issues with the 
technical feasibility of the health monitoring system may drive research required into its 
role in the fault management processes. How sensitive could be the system to external 
disturbances? Could the system offer additional information about health degradation, 
such as which axis or system is affected?   
The integration of the HMS with other aircraft systems presents several open questions. 
To which extent does the HMS complement or supplement current alerting systems? At 
another level, the conclusions suggest that procedures designed to respond to the HMS 
detected faults could help the pilots in the fault management process. How could these be 
designed and integrated with emergency and abnormal aircraft’s procedures? Likewise, 
the training associated with the implementation of the HMS should be explored and 
defined to assure the pilot correctly interprets the information and applies it correctly 
during fault management processes. 
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 Appendix A – Simulator Flight Parameters 
 
 Name  Name 
1 line number 41 Y_wind_v 
2 time 42 Y_wind_w 
3 stick-elev 43 Y_gust_u 
4 stick-aileron 44 Y_gust_alpha 
5 stick-rudder 45 Y_gust_beta 
6 throttle 46 Y_gust_udot 
7 flap 47 Y_gust_alphadot 
8 Y_p roll rate 48 Y_gust_betadot 
9 Y_q pitch rate 49 Y_gust_ug_asymm 
10 Y_r yaw rate 50 Y_gust_ag_asymm 
11 Y_vtas 51 Y_udot X accelerations  
12 Y_alpha 52 Y_vdot Y accelerations 
13 Y_beta sideslip 53 Y_wdot Z accelerations 
14 Y_phi euler roll 54 Y_pdot angular accel. 
15 Y_theta euler pitch 55 Y_qdot angular accel. 
16 Y_psi euler heading 56 Y_rdot angular accel. 
17 Y_h altitude 57 Y_h_disp 
18 Y_x 58 Y_hdot_displayed 
19 Y_y 59 Y_vias_disp 
20 Y_hdot 60 Y_vtas_disp 
21  mass 61 Y_vg_disp 
22 Y_vias 62 Y_engine1_Tn  Thrust 
23 Y_n load factor 63 Y_engine1_FF 
24 Y_gamma FPV pitch 64 Y_engine1_N1 
25 Y_chi FPV Heading (ground track) 65 Y_engine1_N2 
26 Y_gammadot 66 Y_engine2_Tn  Thrust 
27 Y_chidot 67 Y_engine2_FF 
28 Y_bank angle 68 Y_engine2_N1 
29 Y_vg ground speed 69 Y_engine2_N2 
30 Y_de elevator def 70 trim pitch 
31 Y_da aileron def 71 FM button 
32 Y_dr rudder def 72 A/T Disconnect 
33 Y_dte trim elev 73 experiment events 
34 Y_df flaps 74 along track distance 
35 Y_pla throttle?? 75 x - track error 
36 Y_gammacmd cmd=commanded 76 y - track error 
37 Y_chicmd 77 track angle error 
38 Y_phicmd 78 flight path angle error 
39 Y_AT_vtas_ref for A/T 79 column moment on elev. (80 cm) 




Appendix B – Pilot Briefings 
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TUDelft – Georgia Institute of Technology 
Multi-Objective Experiment – Delft, August 2002 
 
Schedule 
Thank you very much for coming, your time is very valuable to us. If all goes well, we 
are hoping to follow the schedule shown below.  
 
8:00 – 8:30  briefing  
 
8:30 – 11:40  about 28 approaches, including practice and break in middle  
 
11:40 – 12:00   debriefing on morning runs 
 
12:00 – 12:40  lunch  
 
12: 45 – 1:10 PM briefing 
 
1:10 – 4:50  about 26 approaches, including a break in the middle 
 




It will be a busy day. However, please know that we welcome any request you may have 
for explanations, and it is your choice when to take breaks. You are also free to end the 




The experiment’s objective is to study and compare different tunnel-in-the-sky displays, 
flight control systems and motion models in the new SIMONA simulator. To test these 
different configurations, we will be flying curved approaches to a fictitious airport using 
the tunnel displays. The aircraft flight model is based on a Cessna Citation II; however 
the cockpit and displays are experimental.  
Even though the simulator is not perfect, please use your best pilot judgment to fly the 
aircraft.  Do your best to act naturally, as if you have passengers on board. This will give 
us an idea whether it is realistic to fly curved approaches with these tunnel displays. 
 
An experimenter will be flying with you as first officer. After each approach and at the 
end of each set of approaches with each Flight Control System he will ask you to answer 
a short questionnaire. He will also brief you before each run and will answer any question 
you may have at any time.  
 
During the experiment, please feel free to verbalize your thought process for him to 
record. We are particularly interested in your thoughts on the tunnel display. In addition, 
let the experimenter know if you find any unexpected situations or problems. 
 
Simulator 
You will notice that there are no rudder pedals in the simulator, but this should not have 
an impact on flying the tunnel because the yaw damper takes care of side slip.  
You will also notice that the control column is a little too high. We are aware of this issue 
and will be corrected in the future.  
The simulator requires following a few initialization and safety procedures. There will be 
an intercom for communications with the control room. For emergencies, you will find a 
red button on your left panel. This button turns off all systems, but does not connect the 
bridge. Please, follow the simulator operator commands for fastening and unfastening the 
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seat belts or leave the cabin. Also, follow his commands for engaging the flight control 
loading system. After this procedure, the control column requires a calibration. Please 
make sure that you can stay clear of the column during calibration.  
The operator will initiate each experiment run when you reply “Ready”. To help reduce 
the possibility of motion sickness or other related problems, the operator will stop the 
simulator by counting 3 – 2 – 1 – “Stop”. The operator will stop the simulator after 
touchdown, since the aircraft model has no brakes. Also, the operator may stop the 





The morning block has several practice approaches and as many data approaches as we 
can fit in by lunch. The practice approaches will give you a chance to get familiar with 
the simulator, and we will not move on if you don’t feel comfortable or you still have 
questions.  
Each simulation run will last no more than 5 minutes and will start with the aircraft 
situated at the beginning of a curved approach presented as a Tunnel-in-the-Sky on the 
PFD. Your task is to manually fly the approach and land. IMC conditions will prevail 
until about 200 ft AGL. You may notice that different motion system models will be 
tested during the experiment.  
Your tunnel tracking performance will be recorded. We will only record data until you 




You are requested to fly the approaches using the autothrottle, until you reach 500 ft 
AGL. At this altitude, you should disconnect the autothrottle and start to reduce your 
speed to 115 – 120 knots as you see fit during the final approach. 
IMPORTANT: However, if you have any problems controlling the aircraft at any point 
during the approach, you should disengage the autothrottle. 
 
Additional remarks: 
The landing gear will be always down, and the flaps will be set by default to 25 deg. 
Your F/O will not do anything except for the following call outs: “500 ft” for A/T 
disconnect, “Runway in Sight”, and “100, 60, 40, 20” before touchdown. 





The Primary Flight Display will be based on a “Tunnel-In-The-Sky” concept.  
 
1- Pitch Attitude 




6- Vertical Speed  
7- Flight Path Vector 
8- Guidance Information: Tunnel-In-The-Sky 







Navigation Display Engine Instruments and Systems Annunciation Display 
A second screen will be used to display a Navigation Display combined with engine 









Flight Control Systems (FCS) and Primary Flight Displays 
During the experiment, we will be testing 3 different types of FCS: 
Basic: Conventional Control, based on the standard Citation manual control 
system. Your control column controls the aileron and elevator. The aircraft 
will start the approach trimmed for a flight path angle of -3 deg.  
 
RC/AH: Airbus Type Control. This FCS is based on the Airbus A320. 
Your column inputs will produce rates of roll and pitch. When you center 
the column, the aircraft will maintain the current attitude, so you shouldn’t 
need to use pitch trim. 
 
FP-Command: Flight Path Vector is a new type of control where the control column 
directly controls the desired direction of flight relative to the ground by 
producing rate of change of track and flight path angle. When you center 
the column, the aircraft will maintain track and flight path angle. To help 
portray the effect of your inputs, the “commanded Flight-Path Vector” on 







Sorry for the surprise on the last run, it was intended to see how pilots react to 
unexpected faults. This afternoon, we will be studying how different displays and alerting 
systems, and may help you detect and react to faults or problems that may impact the 
flying quality of the aircraft. Problems may occur in some runs, but not in all of them. 
The problems may be with the aircraft, the Flight Control Systems, the sensors or with 
the displays.  
The following approaches are similar to the morning approaches except for the 
differences listed below: 
- We will be flying in VMC. 
- You may expect light to moderate turbulence.  
- We will only use FCS1 (Basic) and FCS3 (Flight Path Command) 




In random order, we will be testing a new instrument and an alerting system. The 
instrument is called the “fault meter” and provides information about the health of the 
aircraft handling qualities. The alerting system will give aural and text alerts when the 
health of the system has deteriorated to critical levels. 
 
Fault Meter 
In half of the runs, an instrument (called the Fault Meter) will display the (lack of) health 
on a scale from 0 to 100. The higher the value, the worse is the severity of the problem. 
Any indication in the white arc range is normal. The yellow arc, starting at 60%, is 
considered a Caution, and the red arc, starting at 80% is considered a Warning.  
So that we can measure how and when you use the Fault Meter, you will need to press a 
button in the yoke to see it: “Push To See”. Please use this instrument as you find it 






The alerting system will provide caution and warning alerts based on the same 
information source as the Fault Meter. A caution aural alert will sound and a message 
will be displayed in yellow when the fault value is over 60%. If the fault continues to 
deteriorate and the fault value goes over 80%, a warning alert will sound and a warning 
message will be displayed in red. In some runs, the alerting system will only give 
Warning alerts, while on other runs, both Caution and Warning alerts will be given. 
Before each run, the experimenter will let you know which alerting system configuration 
you will be flying with. 
 
The aural alerts are 3 beeps for Caution, and 6 beeps for Warnings. The warning beeps 







In random order, we will test different combinations of the alerting system and fault 
meter: 
- No Fault Meter and No Alerting System 
- Aural Alerts and Text Messages Only 
- Fault Meter Only 




IMPORTANT: You are requested to fly the approaches using the autothrottle; 
however, if you suspect that the aircraft has a problem or failure, you should disengage 
the autothrottle. This will both give you total manual control of the aircraft and also serve 
as a measure to us of when you detect the fault. To achieve manual control of the throttle, 
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you have to press the disengage button, the throttle levers will not override the A/T. After 
disengaging, use your best judgment to continue or abort the approach, and let your first 





Appendix C – Experiment Design  
Experiment #1: Runs 1-18 Experiment #2: Run 19 
Run: T = Training Motion: 0 = Off   1=On Visual: 0 = IMC   1= VMC 
Pilot RUN FCS Tunnel fault FM Alert motion visual 
1 T1 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 
1 T2 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 
1 T3 3 2 0 0 0 1 0 
                  
Pilot RUN FCS Tunnel fault FM Alert motion visual 
1 T4 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 
1 T5 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
                  
1 1 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 
1 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1 3 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
1 4 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 
1 5 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1 6 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 
                 
Pilot RUN FCS Tunnel fault FM Alert motion visual 
1 T6 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 
1 T7 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 
                  
1 7 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 
1 8 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1 9 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 
1 10 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 
1 11 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 
1 12 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 
                  
Pilot RUN FCS Tunnel fault FM Alert motion visual 
1 T8 3 1 0 0 0 1 0 
1 T9 3 2 0 0 0 1 0 
                  
1 13 3 1 0 0 0 1 0 
1 14 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 
1 15 3 1 0 0 0 1 0 
1 16 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1 17 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 
1 18 3 2 0 0 0 1 0 
1 19 3 1 ? 0 0 1 0 
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Experiment #3: Runs 1-24 Experiment #4: Run 25  
FM: 0=Absent  1=Present Alert: 0=Absent 1=One Phase 2=Two Phase 
Pilot RUN FCS Tunnel Fault FM Alert 
1 T10 1 2 0 1 2 
              
1 1 1 1 2 0 2 
1 2 1 2 0 1 1 
1 3 1 2 5 1 2 
1 4 1 1 0 0 1 
1 5 1 1 6 1 1 
1 6 1 2 0 0 2 
1 7 1 1 0 0 0 
1 8 1 2 4 0 0 
1 9 1 2 1 0 1 
1 10 1 1 0 1 0 
1 11 1 2 3 1 0 
1 12 1 2 0 1 2 
1 13 3 1 10 1 2 
1 14 3 1 11 0 0 
1 15 3 2 0 1 1 
1 16 3 2 9 0 2 
1 17 3 1 7 1 0 
1 18 3 2 0 0 0 
1 19 3 2 12 1 1 
1 20 3 1 0 0 2 
1 21 3 1 0 1 0 
1 22 3 2 8 0 1 
1 23 3 1 0 0 1 
1 24 3 1 0 1 2 
1 25 3 2 0 1 2 
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Experiment #1: Runs 1-18 Experiment #2: Run 19 
Run: T = Training Motion: 0 = Off   1=On Visual: 0 = IMC   1= VMC 
2 T1 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 
2 T2 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 
2 T3 3 2 0 0 0 1 0 
                  
Pilot RUN FCS Tunnel fault FM Alert motion visual 
2 T7 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 
2 T6 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 
                  
2 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 
2 3 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 
2 4 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2 5 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 
2 6 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 
                 
Pilot RUN FCS Tunnel fault FM Alert motion visual 
2 T8 3 1 0 0 0 1 0 
2 T9 3 2 0 0 0 1 0 
                  
2 7 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2 8 3 1 0 0 0 1 0 
2 9 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 
2 10 3 1 0 0 0 1 0 
2 11 3 2 0 0 0 1 0 
2 12 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 
                  
Pilot RUN FCS Tunnel fault FM Alert motion visual 
2 T5 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
2 T4 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 
                  
2 13 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
2 14 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 
2 15 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 
2 16 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2 17 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 
2 18 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 
2 19 3 1 ? 0 0 1 0 
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Experiment #3: Runs 1-24 Experiment #4: Run 25  
FM: 0=Absent  1=Present Alert: 0=Absent 1=One Phase 2=Two Phase 
Pilot RUN FCS Tunnel Surp FM Alert 
2 T10 3 2 0 1 2 
              
2 1 3 2 7 1 1 
2 2 3 2 0 1 1 
2 3 3 1 0 1 2 
2 4 3 1 0 1 0 
2 5 3 2 12 1 2 
2 6 3 1 0 0 0 
2 7 3 2 9 1 0 
2 8 3 2 11 0 2 
2 9 3 1 0 0 2 
2 10 3 2 8 0 0 
2 11 3 1 0 0 1 
2 12 3 1 10 0 1 
2 13 1 2 0 0 0 
2 14 1 2 5 0 1 
2 15 1 1 4 0 2 
2 16 1 2 0 0 1 
2 17 1 1 0 0 2 
2 18 1 1 0 1 1 
2 19 1 2 2 1 0 
2 20 1 1 3 1 1 
2 21 1 1 1 0 0 
2 22 1 2 6 1 2 
2 23 1 1 0 1 0 
2 24 1 2 0 1 2 
2 25 1 2 0 1 2 
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Experiment #1: Runs 1-18 Experiment #2: Run 19 
Run: T = Training Motion: 0 = Off   1=On Visual: 0 = IMC   1= VMC 
3 T1 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 
3 T2 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 
3 T3 3 2 0 0 0 1 0 
                  
Pilot RUN FCS Tunnel fault FM Alert motion visual 
3 T9 3 2 0 0 0 1 0 
3 T8 3 1 0 0 0 1 0 
                  
3 1 3 1 0 0 0 1 0 
3 2 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 
3 3 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 
3 4 3 2 0 0 0 1 0 
3 5 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 
3 6 3 1 0 0 0 1 0 
                 
Pilot RUN FCS Tunnel fault FM Alert motion visual 
3 T5 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
3 T4 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 
                  
3 7 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
3 8 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 
3 9 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 
3 10 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
3 11 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 
3 12 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 
                  
Pilot RUN FCS Tunnel fault FM Alert motion visual 
3 T6 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 
3 T7 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 
                  
3 13 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 
3 14 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 
3 15 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 
3 16 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 
3 17 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 
3 18 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 
3 19 3 1 ? 0 0 1 0 
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Experiment #3: Runs 1-24 Experiment #4: Run 25  
FM: 0=Absent  1=Present Alert: 0=Absent 1=One Phase 2=Two Phase 
Pilot RUN FCS Tunnel Surp FM Alert 
3 T10 1 2 0 1 2 
              
3 1 1 2 0 0 2 
3 2 1 1 0 0 1 
3 3 1 2 0 0 0 
3 4 1 1 0 1 2 
3 5 1 2 6 0 0 
3 6 1 1 1 1 0 
3 7 1 1 3 0 1 
3 8 1 2 0 1 1 
3 9 1 1 4 1 1 
3 10 1 2 0 1 0 
3 11 1 1 2 1 2 
3 12 1 2 5 0 2 
3 13 3 2 0 0 2 
3 14 3 1 9 1 2 
3 15 3 2 8 1 0 
3 16 3 2 7 0 1 
3 17 3 1 0 1 1 
3 18 3 2 0 0 0 
3 19 3 1 0 0 1 
3 20 3 2 0 1 2 
3 21 3 1 10 0 2 
3 22 3 1 12 0 0 
3 23 3 2 11 1 1 
3 24 3 1 0 1 0 
3 25 3 2 0 1 2 
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Experiment #1: Runs 1-18 Experiment #2: Run 19 
Run: T = Training Motion: 0 = Off   1=On Visual: 0 = IMC   1= VMC 
Pilot RUN FCS Tunnel fault FM Alert motion visual 
4 T1 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 
4 T2 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 
4 T3 3 2 0 0 0 1 0 
                  
Pilot RUN FCS Tunnel fault FM Alert motion visual 
4 T4 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 
4 T5 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
                  
4 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 
4 2 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 
4 3 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
4 4 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
4 5 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 
4 6 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
                 
Pilot RUN FCS Tunnel fault FM Alert motion visual 
4 T8 3 1 0 0 0 1 0 
4 T9 3 2 0 0 0 1 0 
                  
4 7 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 
4 8 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 
4 9 3 1 0 0 0 1 0 
4 10 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 
4 11 3 1 0 0 0 1 0 
4 12 3 2 0 0 0 1 0 
                  
Pilot RUN FCS Tunnel fault FM Alert motion visual 
4 T6 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 
4 T7 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 
                  
4 13 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 
4 14 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 
4 15 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 
4 16 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 
4 17 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 
4 18 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 
4 19 3 1 ? 0 0 1 0 
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Experiment #3: Runs 1-24 Experiment #4: Run 25  
FM: 0=Absent  1=Present Alert: 0=Absent 1=One Phase 2=Two Phase 
Pilot RUN FCS Tunnel Surp FM Alert 
4 T10 3 2 0 1 2 
              
4 1 3 2 0 1 2 
4 2 3 2 9 0 1 
4 3 3 1 11 1 2 
4 4 3 1 8 1 1 
4 5 3 2 0 0 0 
4 6 3 2 0 0 2 
4 7 3 1 12 0 2 
4 8 3 2 0 1 1 
4 9 3 1 0 0 1 
4 10 3 2 7 0 0 
4 11 3 2 10 1 0 
4 12 3 1 0 1 0 
4 13 1 1 0 0 0 
4 14 1 2 3 0 0 
4 15 1 2 1 1 1 
4 16 1 1 0 0 1 
4 17 1 1 0 1 0 
4 18 1 2 0 0 2 
4 19 1 1 6 0 2 
4 20 1 2 5 1 1 
4 21 1 1 0 1 2 
4 22 1 2 0 1 1 
4 23 1 1 4 1 2 
4 24 1 1 2 0 1 
4 25 1 2 0 1 2 
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Experiment #1: Runs 1-18 Experiment #2: Run 19 
Run: T = Training Motion: 0 = Off   1=On Visual: 0 = IMC   1= VMC 
Pilot RUN FCS Tunnel fault FM Alert motion visual 
5 T1 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 
5 T2 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 
5 T3 3 2 0 0 0 1 0 
                  
Pilot RUN FCS Tunnel fault FM Alert motion visual 
5 T7 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 
5 T6 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 
                  
5 1 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 
5 2 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 
5 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 
5 4 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 
5 5 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 
5 6 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 
                 
Pilot RUN FCS Tunnel fault FM Alert motion visual 
5 T5 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
5 T4 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 
                  
5 7 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
5 8 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
5 9 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 
5 10 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
5 11 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
5 12 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 
                  
Pilot RUN FCS Tunnel fault FM Alert motion visual 
5 T8 3 1 0 0 0 1 0 
5 T9 3 2 0 0 0 1 0 
                  
5 13 3 2 0 0 0 1 0 
5 14 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 
5 15 3 2 0 0 0 1 0 
5 16 3 1 0 0 0 1 0 
5 17 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 
5 18 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 
5 19 3 1 ? 0 0 1 0 
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Experiment #3: Runs 1-24 Experiment #4: Run 25  
FM: 0=Absent  1=Present Alert: 0=Absent 1=One Phase 2=Two Phase 
Pilot RUN FCS Tunnel Surp FM Alert 
5 T10 1 2 0 1 2 
              
5 1 1 2 2 1 1 
5 2 1 2 1 0 2 
5 3 1 1 0 1 0 
5 4 1 2 0 0 1 
5 5 1 1 5 0 0 
5 6 1 1 0 0 2 
5 7 1 2 0 1 1 
5 8 1 1 0 0 0 
5 9 1 2 6 0 1 
5 10 1 2 4 1 0 
5 11 1 1 0 1 2 
5 12 1 2 3 1 2 
5 13 3 2 7 1 2 
5 14 3 1 8 0 2 
5 15 3 1 0 0 0 
5 16 3 2 10 0 0 
5 17 3 1 0 1 1 
5 18 3 1 9 1 1 
5 19 3 2 0 0 2 
5 20 3 2 12 0 1 
5 21 3 1 0 1 2 
5 22 3 1 0 1 0 
5 23 3 2 0 0 1 
5 24 3 1 11 1 0 




Experiment #1: Runs 1-18 Experiment #2: Run 19 
Run: T = Training Motion: 0 = Off   1=On Visual: 0 = IMC   1= VMC 
Pilot RUN FCS Tunnel fault FM Alert motion visual 
6 T1 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 
6 T2 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 
6 T3 3 2 0 0 0 1 0 
                  
Pilot RUN FCS Tunnel fault FM Alert motion visual 
6 T9 3 2 0 0 0 1 0 
6 T8 3 1 0 0 0 1 0 
                  
6 1 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 
6 2 3 1 0 0 0 1 0 
6 3 3 2 0 0 0 1 0 
6 4 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 
6 5 3 1 0 0 0 1 0 
6 6 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 
                 
Pilot RUN FCS Tunnel fault FM Alert motion visual 
6 T6 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 
6 T7 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 
                  
6 7 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 
6 8 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 
6 9 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 
6 10 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 
6 11 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 
6 12 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 
                  
Pilot RUN FCS Tunnel fault FM Alert motion visual 
6 T5 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
6 T4 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 
                  
6 13 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
6 14 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
6 15 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 
6 16 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
6 17 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 
6 18 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 
6 19 3 1 ? 0 0 1 0 
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Experiment #3: Runs 1-24 Experiment #4: Run 25  
FM: 0=Absent  1=Present Alert: 0=Absent 1=One Phase 2=Two Phase 
Pilot RUN FCS Tunnel Surp FM Alert 
6 T10 3 2 0 1 2 
              
6 1 3 2 10 1 1 
6 2 3 1 0 0 0 
6 3 3 2 0 1 2 
6 4 3 2 0 0 1 
6 5 3 1 9 0 0 
6 6 3 2 0 1 0 
6 7 3 1 8 1 2 
6 8 3 1 7 0 2 
6 9 3 2 12 1 0 
6 10 3 2 11 0 1 
6 11 3 1 0 0 2 
6 12 3 2 0 1 1 
6 13 1 2 1 1 2 
6 14 1 1 0 1 1 
6 15 1 1 0 1 2 
6 16 1 2 0 0 0 
6 17 1 1 6 1 0 
6 18 1 2 4 0 1 
6 19 1 1 3 0 2 
6 20 1 2 0 1 0 
6 21 1 1 2 0 0 
6 22 1 1 5 1 1 
6 23 1 2 0 0 2 
6 24 1 1 0 0 1 
6 25 1 2 0 1 2 
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Experiment #1: Runs 1-18 Experiment #2: Run 19 
Run: T = Training Motion: 0 = Off   1=On Visual: 0 = IMC   1= VMC 
Pilot RUN FCS Tunnel fault FM Alert motion visual 
7 T1 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 
7 T2 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 
7 T3 3 2 0 0 0 1 0 
                  
Pilot RUN FCS Tunnel fault FM Alert motion visual 
7 T4 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 
7 T5 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
                  
7 1 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 
7 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
7 3 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 
7 4 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
7 5 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 
7 6 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
                 
Pilot RUN FCS Tunnel fault FM Alert motion visual 
7 T6 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 
7 T7 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 
                  
7 7 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 
7 8 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 
7 9 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 
7 10 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 
7 11 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 
7 12 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 
                  
Pilot RUN FCS Tunnel fault FM Alert motion visual 
7 T8 3 1 0 0 0 1 0 
7 T9 3 2 0 0 0 1 0 
                  
7 13 3 1 0 0 0 1 0 
7 14 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 
7 15 3 2 0 0 0 1 0 
7 16 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 
7 17 3 2 0 0 0 1 0 
7 18 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 
7 19 3 1 ? 0 0 1 0 
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Experiment #3: Runs 1-24 Experiment #4: Run 25  
FM: 0=Absent  1=Present Alert: 0=Absent 1=One Phase 2=Two Phase 
Pilot RUN FCS Tunnel Surp FM Alert 
7 T10 1 2 0 1 2 
              
7 1 1 2 2 1 0 
7 2 1 2 4 0 1 
7 3 1 1 0 0 1 
7 4 1 2 0 1 2 
7 5 1 1 5 1 1 
7 6 1 2 0 1 1 
7 7 1 1 6 1 2 
7 8 1 1 0 0 2 
7 9 1 2 0 0 2 
7 10 1 1 3 0 0 
7 11 1 2 0 1 0 
7 12 1 1 1 0 2 
7 13 3 1 0 0 1 
7 14 3 2 8 0 0 
7 15 3 2 0 0 0 
7 16 3 1 0 1 2 
7 17 3 2 11 0 2 
7 18 3 1 0 1 0 
7 19 3 1 12 1 0 
7 20 3 2 0 1 1 
7 21 3 1 7 0 1 
7 22 3 2 10 1 1 
7 23 3 1 0 0 0 
7 24 3 2 9 1 2 




Experiment #1: Runs 1-18 Experiment #2: Run 19 
Run: T = Training Motion: 0 = Off   1=On Visual: 0 = IMC   1= VMC 
Pilot RUN FCS Tunnel fault FM Alert motion visual 
8 T1 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 
8 T2 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 
8 T3 3 2 0 0 0 1 0 
                  
Pilot RUN FCS Tunnel fault FM Alert motion visual 
8 T7 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 
8 T6 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 
                  
8 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 
8 2 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 
8 3 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 
8 4 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 
8 5 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 
8 6 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 
                 
Pilot RUN FCS Tunnel fault FM Alert motion visual 
8 T8 3 1 0 0 0 1 0 
8 T9 3 2 0 0 0 1 0 
                  
8 7 3 2 0 0 0 1 0 
8 8 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 
8 9 3 2 0 0 0 1 0 
8 10 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 
8 11 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 
8 12 3 2 0 0 0 1 0 
                  
Pilot RUN FCS Tunnel fault FM Alert motion visual 
8 T5 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
8 T4 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 
                  
8 13 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
8 14 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
8 15 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 
8 16 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
8 17 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 
8 18 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
8 19 3 1 ? 0 0 1 0 
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Experiment #3: Runs 1-24 Experiment #4: Run 25  
FM: 0=Absent  1=Present Alert: 0=Absent 1=One Phase 2=Two Phase 
Pilot RUN FCS Tunnel Surp FM Alert 
8 T10 3 2 0 1 2 
              
8 1 3 2 0 1 0 
8 2 3 1 10 1 0 
8 3 3 1 0 1 1 
8 4 3 2 12 0 2 
8 5 3 1 11 0 0 
8 6 3 2 0 0 2 
8 7 3 2 0 0 1 
8 8 3 1 8 0 1 
8 9 3 1 0 1 2 
8 10 3 2 9 1 1 
8 11 3 1 0 0 0 
8 12 3 2 7 1 2 
8 13 1 1 5 0 2 
8 14 1 2 0 1 2 
8 15 1 2 6 1 0 
8 16 1 1 3 1 2 
8 17 1 2 0 0 0 
8 18 1 1 4 1 1 
8 19 1 2 0 0 1 
8 20 1 1 0 1 1 
8 21 1 2 0 1 0 
8 22 1 2 2 0 0 
8 23 1 1 1 0 1 
8 24 1 1 0 0 2 




Experiment #1: Runs 1-18 Experiment #2: Run 19 
Run: T = Training Motion: 0 = Off   1=On Visual: 0 = IMC   1= VMC 
Pilot RUN FCS Tunnel fault FM Alert motion visual 
9 T1 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 
9 T2 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 
9 T3 3 2 0 0 0 1 0 
                  
Pilot RUN FCS Tunnel fault FM Alert motion visual 
9 T9 3 2 0 0 0 1 0 
9 T8 3 1 0 0 0 1 0 
                  
9 1 3 1 0 0 0 1 0 
9 2 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 
9 3 3 2 0 0 0 1 0 
9 4 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 
9 5 3 2 0 0 0 1 0 
9 6 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 
                 
Pilot RUN FCS Tunnel fault FM Alert motion visual 
9 T5 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
9 T4 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 
                  
9 7 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
9 8 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 
9 9 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
9 10 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 
9 11 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
9 12 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 
                  
Pilot RUN FCS Tunnel fault FM Alert motion visual 
9 T6 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 
9 T7 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 
                  
9 13 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 
9 14 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 
9 15 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 
9 16 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 
9 17 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 
9 18 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 
9 19 3 1 ? 0 0 1 0 
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Experiment #3: Runs 1-24 Experiment #4: Run 25  
FM: 0=Absent  1=Present Alert: 0=Absent 1=One Phase 2=Two Phase 
Pilot RUN FCS Tunnel Surp FM Alert 
9 T10 1 2 0 1 2 
              
9 1 1 2 3 0 2 
9 2 1 1 0 1 0 
9 3 1 2 6 0 1 
9 4 1 2 1 1 0 
9 5 1 1 0 1 1 
9 6 1 2 0 1 2 
9 7 1 1 0 0 0 
9 8 1 1 2 1 1 
9 9 1 2 0 0 2 
9 10 1 1 5 1 2 
9 11 1 2 4 0 0 
9 12 1 2 0 0 1 
9 13 3 1 0 1 2 
9 14 3 2 0 0 0 
9 15 3 1 9 0 1 
9 16 3 1 7 0 0 
9 17 3 2 0 1 0 
9 18 3 2 10 1 2 
9 19 3 1 0 0 2 
9 20 3 2 11 1 0 
9 21 3 1 0 0 1 
9 22 3 1 0 1 1 
9 23 3 2 8 0 2 
9 24 3 1 12 1 1 
9 25 3 2 0 1 2 
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Experiment #1: Runs 1-18 Experiment #2: Run 19 
Run: T = Training Motion: 0 = Off   1=On Visual: 0 = IMC   1= VMC 
Pilot RUN FCS Tunnel fault FM Alert motion visual 
10 T1 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 
10 T2 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 
10 T3 3 2 0 0 0 1 0 
                  
Pilot RUN FCS Tunnel fault FM Alert motion visual 
10 T4 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 
10 T5 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
                  
10 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
10 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 
10 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
10 4 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 
10 5 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 
10 6 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
                 
Pilot RUN FCS Tunnel fault FM Alert motion visual 
10 T8 3 1 0 0 0 1 0 
10 T9 3 2 0 0 0 1 0 
                  
10 7 3 1 0 0 0 1 0 
10 8 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 
10 9 3 1 0 0 0 1 0 
10 10 3 2 0 0 0 1 0 
10 11 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 
10 12 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 
                  
Pilot RUN FCS Tunnel fault FM Alert motion visual 
10 T6 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 
10 T7 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 
                  
10 13 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 
10 14 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 
10 15 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 
10 16 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 
10 17 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 
10 18 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 
10 19 3 1 ? 0 0 1 0 
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Experiment #3: Runs 1-24 Experiment #4: Run 25  
FM: 0=Absent  1=Present Alert: 0=Absent 1=One Phase 2=Two Phase 
Pilot RUN FCS Tunnel Surp FM Alert 
10 T10 3 2 0 1 2 
              
10 1 3 1 0 1 1 
10 2 3 2 0 0 1 
10 3 3 1 11 1 1 
10 4 3 1 8 1 0 
10 5 3 2 0 1 2 
10 6 3 1 7 0 2 
10 7 3 1 9 0 0 
10 8 3 2 0 0 0 
10 9 3 1 10 0 1 
10 10 3 2 12 1 2 
10 11 3 1 0 1 0 
10 12 3 2 0 0 2 
10 13 1 2 0 0 2 
10 14 1 1 0 0 0 
10 15 1 2 5 1 0 
10 16 1 1 0 0 1 
10 17 1 2 4 1 2 
10 18 1 2 0 1 2 
10 19 1 1 0 1 1 
10 20 1 1 6 1 1 
10 21 1 2 2 0 2 
10 22 1 1 3 0 1 
10 23 1 2 0 1 0 
10 24 1 2 1 0 0 




Experiment #1: Runs 1-18 Experiment #2: Run 19 
Run: T = Training Motion: 0 = Off   1=On Visual: 0 = IMC   1= VMC 
Pilot RUN FCS Tunnel fault FM Alert motion visual 
11 T1 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 
11 T2 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 
11 T3 3 2 0 0 0 1 0 
                  
Pilot RUN FCS Tunnel fault FM Alert motion visual 
11 T7 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 
11 T6 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 
                  
11 1 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 
11 2 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 
11 3 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 
11 4 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 
11 5 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 
11 6 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 
                 
Pilot RUN FCS Tunnel fault FM Alert motion visual 
11 T5 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
11 T4 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 
                  
11 7 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
11 8 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
11 9 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 
11 10 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
11 11 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 
11 12 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 
                  
Pilot RUN FCS Tunnel fault FM Alert motion visual 
11 T8 3 1 0 0 0 1 0 
11 T9 3 2 0 0 0 1 0 
                  
11 13 3 1 0 0 0 1 0 
11 14 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 
11 15 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 
11 16 3 1 0 0 0 1 0 
11 17 3 2 0 0 0 1 0 
11 18 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 
11 19 3 1 ? 0 0 1 0 
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Experiment #3: Runs 1-24 Experiment #4: Run 25  
FM: 0=Absent  1=Present Alert: 0=Absent 1=One Phase 2=Two Phase 
Pilot RUN FCS Tunnel Surp FM Alert 
11 T10 1 2 0 1 2 
              
11 1 1 1 6 0 2 
11 2 1 2 0 0 1 
11 3 1 2 0 0 2 
11 4 1 1 5 0 0 
11 5 1 2 0 1 1 
11 6 1 2 3 1 1 
11 7 1 1 1 1 2 
11 8 1 2 0 0 0 
11 9 1 1 0 1 2 
11 10 1 2 0 1 0 
11 11 1 1 2 0 1 
11 12 1 1 4 1 0 
11 13 3 2 0 1 0 
11 14 3 1 12 0 0 
11 15 3 1 0 0 1 
11 16 3 2 11 0 1 
11 17 3 2 7 1 1 
11 18 3 1 8 1 2 
11 19 3 2 10 0 2 
11 20 3 1 0 1 2 
11 21 3 2 0 1 1 
11 22 3 2 9 1 0 
11 23 3 1 0 0 0 
11 24 3 1 0 0 2 




Experiment #1: Runs 1-18 Experiment #2: Run 19 
Run: T = Training Motion: 0 = Off   1=On Visual: 0 = IMC   1= VMC 
Pilot RUN FCS Tunnel fault FM Alert motion visual 
12 T1 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 
12 T2 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 
12 T3 3 2 0 0 0 1 0 
                  
Pilot RUN FCS Tunnel fault FM Alert motion visual 
12 T9 3 2 0 0 0 1 0 
12 T8 3 1 0 0 0 1 0 
                  
12 1 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 
12 2 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 
12 3 3 1 0 0 0 1 0 
12 4 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 
12 5 3 1 0 0 0 1 0 
12 6 3 1 0 0 0 1 0 
                 
Pilot RUN FCS Tunnel fault FM Alert motion visual 
12 T6 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 
12 T7 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 
                  
12 7 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 
12 8 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 
12 9 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 
12 10 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 
12 11 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 
12 12 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 
                  
Pilot RUN FCS Tunnel fault FM Alert motion visual 
12 T5 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
12 T4 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 
                  
12 13 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
12 14 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 
12 15 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
12 16 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 
12 17 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 
12 18 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 
12 19 3 1 ? 0 0 1 0 
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Experiment #3: Runs 1-24 Experiment #4: Run 25  
FM: 0=Absent  1=Present Alert: 0=Absent 1=One Phase 2=Two Phase 
Pilot RUN FCS Tunnel Surp FM Alert 
12 T10 3 2 0 1 2 
              
12 1 3 2 0 1 1 
12 2 3 1 7 1 0 
12 3 3 1 9 0 2 
12 4 3 2 0 1 2 
12 5 3 1 0 1 0 
12 6 3 2 0 0 0 
12 7 3 1 0 0 1 
12 8 3 1 12 0 1 
12 9 3 2 0 0 2 
12 10 3 1 11 1 2 
12 11 3 1 10 0 0 
12 12 3 2 8 1 1 
12 13 1 1 0 0 1 
12 14 1 2 3 1 0 
12 15 1 1 1 1 1 
12 16 1 2 6 0 0 
12 17 1 2 0 1 0 
12 18 1 1 0 1 2 
12 19 1 2 2 1 2 
12 20 1 2 0 0 0 
12 21 1 1 4 0 2 
12 22 1 2 0 0 2 
12 23 1 1 0 1 1 
12 24 1 2 5 0 1 
12 25 1 2 0 1 2 
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Appendix D – Questionnaires 
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Experiment #1 FCS Block Questionnaire 
With this FCS, it was easy to fly the tunnel with an adequate level of accuracy. 
 

























What display features did you rely on the most? 
 
Are there any features that you would like to see in this display? 
 
How would you describe your strategy in flying with this FCS? 
 
The simulation felt accurate and realistic. 
 





































Experiment #3 and #4 Post Run Questionnaire 




How certain are you about your previous answer? 






























What was your first indication of malfunction? 
 
What did you look at next to verify the malfunction? 
 
How did you confirm the malfunction? 
The alert system helped to detect the fault. 
 

























The Fault Meter helped to detect the fault. 
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